Constraints on Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics by Blood, Casey
 1 
Constraints on Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics 
 
Casey Blood 
Professor Emeritus of Physics, Rutgers University 
Sarasota, FL 
Email: CaseyBlood@gmail.com 
 
 
Abstract 
A succinct statement and justification of all the principles necessary to 
understand and evaluate interpretations of quantum mechanics is given.   These 
principles provide strong constraints on interpretations.  They imply the 
particle-like properties of mass, energy, momentum, spin, charge, and locality 
are actually properties of the wave function; and this in turn implies there is no 
evidence for the existence of particles.  In addition, there is currently no 
experimental evidence for collapse, and a theory of collapse encounters 
significant hurdles.  Further, the probability law is found to rule out the many-
worlds interpretation, so all three major interpretations encounter serious to 
fatal problems.  An interpretation which conforms to all the principles is given. 
 
     PACS numbers: 03.65-w, 03.65.Ta 
 
 
Introduction. 
 Quantum mechanics is a highly successful theory which accurately 
describes physical reality in a wide range of situations.  Its use of the non-intuitive 
wave function, however, means that the true nature of the physical reality described 
is far from clear.  Because of this, many different interpretations—conceptual 
pictures of the nature of the underlying reality—have been proposed.  There are 
three major interpretations and perhaps a dozen others, so one sometimes gets the 
impression that it is not possible to gain a deeper understanding of what underlies 
the theory. 
 I think, however, that the situation is not as chaotic as it appears.  The 
reason there are so many interpretations is that their originators were not always 
aware of all the relevant properties of the theory itself.  So what we do here is list 
and justify all the properties of quantum mechanics relevant to its interpretation.  
This approach brings order to the interpretive problem and narrows down the set of 
possible interpretations. 
 
 History. To understand how a successful theory could require an 
interpretation, we need to briefly review the history of physics.  Classical 
mechanics, discovered almost entirely by Newton around 1700, was a very 
successful mathematical scheme for predicting the paths of the atoms that matter 
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was presumably made of.  Since it involved the flight of easily visualized particles 
through our familiar three-dimensional space, classical physics gave a picture of 
reality which was compatible with our conventional, everyday view of the world.  
Quantum mechanics, however, is a different story.  It was discovered in the search 
for a mathematical scheme which would explain classically unsolvable problems 
such as why the hydrogen atom radiates certain colors of light.  Rather than being 
the brainchild of a single person, however, there were at least half a dozen major 
physicists who, over a period of 25 years, each discovered an essential piece of the 
puzzle.  And with each piece, the mathematics moved farther away from our 
everyday view of the world.   
The end result of these separate insights—the equation discovered by 
Schrödinger in 1926—was a scheme which is highly successful.  In addition to the 
hydrogen atom spectrum, quantum mechanics describes a great many 
phenomena—all the properties of atoms and nuclei, semiconductors, lasers, the 
systematics of elementary particles—and it has never given a result in conflict with 
experiment.  But its mathematics involves the mysterious wave function rather than 
the easily-visualized particles, so it no longer has a clear correspondence with our 
commonplace view of reality.  Because of this, one needs an interpretation of the 
mathematics to understand how it relates to our perceived physical world. 
 
 Peculiarities of Quantum Mechanics.  Quantum mechanics is difficult to 
understand because it has two peculiar properties.  The first, illustrated by the 
Schrödinger’s cat experiment in the next section, is that the wave function of 
quantum mechanics contains several simultaneously existing versions of reality—
the cat is both alive and dead at the same time.  We perceive only one of those 
possible versions of reality.  But quantum mechanics treats all versions equally, so 
it does not tell us why we perceive a particular version.   
 The fact that there are several versions of reality leads to the second 
peculiar property, probability.  Through an empirically verified law which appears 
to be separate from the rest of the mathematics, quantum mechanics tells us the 
probability of seeing a live cat or a dead cat.  There is currently no clear 
understanding of this ‘rolling-the-dice’ aspect of the theory.  (There is one other 
peculiar quantum mechanical property, non-locality—see appendix A8.  But, 
although it is of interest in its own right, non-locality is not a major factor in 
determining the correct interpretation.) 
 
 Major interpretations. There are three major interpretations which attempt 
to give an understanding of these properties.  The first is to suppose that, in 
addition to the many quantum versions of reality, there is an actual, objective 
reality made of particles, and it is the particles, rather than the wave functions, that 
we perceive.  A second potential way out of the multiple-versions-of-reality 
problem is to suppose the wave function ‘collapses’ down to just one version; the 
dead cat wave function might collapse to zero, for example, leaving just a live cat 
(wave function) to be perceived.  And a third possible solution, the Everett many-
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worlds interpretation [1], is to suppose all versions always exist, so there are many 
version of each of us!?  We will explain these in more detail and show that each 
runs into severe difficulties.   
 
 Conclusion.  The implication of these results is that the theory of the 
physical universe, as it currently stands, is incomplete.  For if the probability law is 
to hold, there must be some ‘mechanism’ that singles out just one version as the 
one corresponding to our perceptions.  But there is no evidence for, and substantial 
evidence against, the conventionally proposed mechanisms—particles, hidden 
variables and collapse.  Thus the most likely candidate for the singling out 
mechanism at this time is a perceiving “Mind” not subject to the laws of quantum 
mechanics (in contrast to the physical brain, which is subject to those laws). 
 
 Primary strategy.  In an attempt to eliminate any pre-judgments on the true 
nature of physical reality, we use the strategy of examining the connections 
between the mathematics of quantum mechanics and our perceptions.   
 
 Level of the paper.  As much as we could, we took care to make the main 
text understandable to the general reader, and even to make parts of it a primer on 
the interpretation of quantum mechanics.  The more complicated mathematical 
derivations of the principles, as well as brief descriptions and analyses of relevant 
experiments, are relegated to the appendices. 
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1. Versions of Reality. 
 
A. Visualizing the wave function.  The Schrödinger equation of quantum 
mechanics governs the motion of the wave functions, so it is (on the least abstract 
level) the wave functions, rather than particles, which are the ‘physical objects’ in 
the mathematics of quantum mechanics.  A useful visual picture of the wave 
function is that it is matter spread out in a mist or cloud of varying density.  The 
Schrödinger equation determines the shape of the cloud, how it moves through 
space, and how it responds to other clouds corresponding to other ‘particles.’  The 
wave function of a macroscopic object like a cat or a human being, composed of 
billions of individual wave functions, is extremely complicated, but that does not 
prevent us from deducing certain relevant general characteristics. 
 
 B. Notation and terminology. We often have to refer to the ‘state’ of a 
particle or detector or observer—the location of a silver atom, a detector reading 
yes or no, an observer perceiving a live or dead cat.  We will sometimes use square 
brackets, [label], and sometimes the ‘ket’ notation label| , where the label 
describes the relevant property—the position of a silver atom and so on—of the 
wave function.   
[Technically the ket refers to the abstract ‘state vector.’  But there is no easy 
visualization of the state vector, so, since the wave function contains all the 
necessary information, we will not use the term.]  
 
 C. Many versions of reality.  The world around us certainly appears to be 
unique, the physical world, upon which we all agree.  But in quantum mechanics, 
the highly successful mathematical description of nature, there is no unique 
physical world; instead there are many simultaneously existing versions of physical 
reality.  We will give two examples, nuclear decay and Schrödinger’s cat, here.  
Two other examples of simultaneously existing versions of reality, involving 
polarization of light and the spin of particles, are given in appendices A1 and A2.  
These two phenomena are important because they are often used in theoretical 
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arguments and in the experiments employed to test the peculiarities of quantum 
mechanics. 
 
 D. Nuclear decay.  We first consider the wave function of a single 
radioactive nucleus.  In the mathematics of quantum mechanics, there is both a part 
of the wave function corresponding to an undecayed nucleus and a part 
corresponding to a decayed (spontaneously split into several parts) nucleus.  That 
is, the state of the system at a given time is 
 
[the nucleus radioactively decays] 
and, simultaneously 
[the same nucleus does not decay] 
 
Both options, both branches of the wave function, exist simultaneously!  One 
cannot get around this; the successes of QM depend on it. 
 Note that we are not saying at this point whether ‘the nucleus itself’ is both 
decayed and undecayed.  We are simply saying here that in the mathematics, ‘the 
nucleus’ is both decayed and undecayed.  (But in section 7 we will claim there is no 
such thing as ‘the nucleus.’) 
  
 E. Schrödinger’s cat.  The Schrödinger’s cat experiment [2] is a clever and 
dramatic way of boosting this strange multi-reality situation from the atomic 
(nuclear) to the macroscopic level.  A cat is put in a box along with a vial of 
cyanide.  Outside the box are a radioactive source and a detector of the radiation.  
The detector is turned on for five seconds and then turned off.  If it records one or 
more counts of radiation, an electrical signal is sent to the box, the vial of cyanide 
is broken, and the cat dies.  If it records no counts, nothing happens and the cat 
lives. 
 Classically, there is no problem here (unless you are a cat lover).  Either a 
nucleus radioactively decays, the cat dies and you perceive a dead cat when you 
open the box; or no nucleus decays, the cat lives and you perceive a live cat.  
Schematically, in the classical case, 
 
either 
[nucleus decays] [cat dies] [you perceive a dead cat] 
or 
[no nucleus decays] [cat lives] [you perceive a live cat] 
 
 But this is not what happens in the quantum case.  There, the wave function 
of the nucleus, the cat, and you (as the observer) is 
 
[nucleus decays] 
[cat dies] 
[version 1 of you perceives a dead cat] 
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and, simultaneously 
[nucleus does not decay] 
[cat lives] 
[version 2 of you perceives a live cat] 
 
There are now two full-blown, simultaneously existing versions of physical reality.  
In one, there is a dead version of the cat, in the other there is a live version.  In one, 
version 1 of you perceives a dead cat, in the other, version 2 of you perceives a live 
cat.  So there are two simultaneously existing, equally valid versions of you, each 
perceiving something different!   
 In reality, your perceptions will correspond to one version or the other (but 
that does not necessarily imply that only one version ‘exists’). 
 
 
 
2. Quantum Principles of Perception. 
 
 We will show here that quantum mechanics does not conflict with our 
perception of a seemingly classical world, where by “quantum mechanics,” we 
mean the QMA scheme of section 4—no particles, no collapse, no sentient beings, 
just the linear Schrödinger equation for the wave function. 
 
 A. Agreement of quantum mechanics with our perceptions. 
Schrödinger’s cat gives an illustration of a set of general properties which follow 
from the agreement in all known cases between observation and the quantum 
mechanically predicted characteristics of the versions of reality: 
 
2-1. Quantum mechanics gives many potential versions of reality.  
2-2. In all instances where the calculations and observations can be done, 
there is always one and only one version whose characteristics corresponds 
exactly—qualitatively and quantitatively—to our physical perceptions.   
2-3. Quantum mechanics does not single out any version for perception. 
2-4. All observers agree on the perceived version. 
 
Property 2-2 is, in my opinion, the pivotal observation in deducing the ‘correct’ 
interpretation of quantum mechanics.  Although a good deal of work needs to be 
done to rigorously show this, it would appear to imply that physical reality is 
composed of wave functions alone, and the wave functions are what ‘we’ perceive. 
 
 B. Versions are in isolated universes.  The most important mathematical 
property of quantum mechanics is that it is a linear theory.  Because of this, when a 
wave function divides into a sum of different versions, each version evolves in time 
entirely independently of the other versions present.  It is as if (see appendix A3 for 
a proof) 
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2-5. Each version of reality corresponds to a different, isolated universe.  
There can be no communication of any kind—via light, sound, touch, email, 
and so on—between the different versions.  
 
 C. Classical consistency of observation.  (See appendix A4 for details.)  
The tendency is to suppose that, because quantum mechanics contains several 
simultaneously existing versions of reality, it must be that in the un-amended 
theory (no collapse) we should perceive several simultaneous versions of reality, 
akin to a double exposure.  But that is not correct.  In quantum mechanics proper 
(QMA), only the versions of the observer perceive.  Each version, however, is in a 
separate, isolated universe and can therefore perceive only what is in that universe; 
a version in one universe can never perceive what occurs in a separate universe.  
Thus 
 
2-6. Perception of more than one outcome of an experiment by an observer 
can never occur within quantum mechanics. 
 
 Next, if we look in the box twice after doing the Schrödinger’s cat 
experiment, we certainly expect, from experience, to see the same thing both times.  
One can show that this holds in quantum mechanics also. 
 
2-7. If two observations are made successively, quantum mechanics implies 
the same consistency of results as one obtains in a classical universe.   
 
2-8. A technical version of 2-7 is that if one measures the same property 
twice in a row, quantum mechanics implies one will get the same result. 
 
 Finally, in addition to an observer perceiving only one version of reality, we 
also know experientially that two observers never disagree on what they perceive.  
But this also follows from quantum mechanics.   
 
2-9. Quantum mechanics implies that two observers can never disagree on 
what they perceive. 
 
 Principles 2-5 through 2-9 constitute much of the content of what is called 
measurement theory [3-5].  (There is also a principle about perceiving only the 
eigenvalues of relevant operators, but that is not relevant here.)  They show that in 
all circumstances, quantum mechanics itself implies a ‘classical’ consistency of 
perceptual results even though no classical (that is, single-version-of-reality) reality 
was assumed. 
 
 Superselection rule.  Principles 2-5 through 2-9 also imply it is appropriate 
to apply a ‘superselection rule’ to the various versions of reality.  Linear 
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combinations of, say, the various states of the observer are not prohibited, but (as in 
the case where one has one universe with charge 2e and another with charge 3e) 
when there is no interaction between different solutions of the Schrödinger 
equation, nothing—no new physical insight—is gained by considering linear 
combinations of the states.  Thus the ‘preferred basis problem,’ in which linear 
combinations of versions of the observer are considered, seems to be a red herring. 
 
 
 
3. Randomness and Probability. 
 
 A. Randomness in a Modified Schrödinger’s cat experiment. We wish to 
run this experiment many times, so, to avoid killing so many cats, we will modify 
it.  Instead of the detector being hooked up to the box with the cat inside, it is 
connected to a memory device.  Each time the experiment is run (the detector is 
turned on for 5 seconds and then turned off), the device records a 1 if a decay is 
detected and a 0 if no decay is detected.  On a given run, quantum mechanics does 
not tell us whether a 0 or a 1 will appear. 
 
 B. Probability.  Suppose we run the same experiment 10,000 times and we 
get 6,500 ones (6,500 decays)and 3,500 zeros (3,500 no decays).  Now we run the 
experiment 10,000 times again.  Then, from having done similar sets of 
experiments many times, we know that we will get close to 6,500 ones and 3,500 
zeros.  That is, after many runs of the experiment, the fraction of zeros and ones is 
not just any number between 0 and 1.  Instead it will be near .65 for ones and .35 
for zeros.  That is, there is a probability of .65 of obtaining a one and a probability 
of .35 of obtaining a zero. 
 
 C. Probability and the wave function.  There is a formula linking a 
property of the wave function and probability.  Suppose we focus on a single 
nucleus.  At time 0, say, the nucleus is not decayed, so its wave function is [not 
decayed].  But after 5 seconds, its wave function is a combination of [not decayed] 
and [decayed].  This is written as a sum in quantum mechanics, so we have 
 
[wave fcn after 5 sec]=a(0)[not decayed]+a(1)[decayed] 
 
The a(0) and a(1) are ‘coefficients;’ their values—actually their values squared—
tell ‘how much’ of the wave function corresponds to not decayed and how much to 
decayed.  Pictorially, |a(0)|2 and |a(1)| 2 tell ‘how much’ of the ‘mist’ making up the 
wave function is in the not-decayed aspect and how much is in the decayed aspect. 
 The link to probability is the following:  Suppose 
 
|a(0)|2 =.35,   |a(1)| 2 =.65. 
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Then the probability of perceiving [not decayed] is .35 and the probability of 
perceiving [decayed] is .65.  
 
 D. The |a(i)|2 probability law. As before, we start out at time 0 in the [not 
decayed] state.  As time progresses, the state will be some combination of [not 
decayed] and [decayed]. 
 
[wave function at time t]=a(0,t)[not decayed]+a(1,t)[decayed] 
1|),1(||),0(| 22  tata  
 
The probabilities for the two states at time t are then 
 
probability of not decayed at time t=|a(0,t)| 2 
probability of decayed at time t=|a(1,t)| 2 
 
 This statement generalizes.  Suppose at time t, the quantum state of a 
system is the sum of several possibilities,  iia |)( , with the ith possible ‘state,’ 
i| , having coefficient a(i).  Then 
 
3-1.  The |a(i)|2 probability law.  If an experiment is run many times, a 
physical reality with characteristics corresponding to version i will be 
perceived a fraction |a(i)|2 of the time. 
 
Exactly the same law, but in a different guise, is called the 2|)(| x  probability law, 
or the Born rule [6] (Born first proposed the idea of probability), where )(x  is the 
wave function at position x.  (In this form, it is often interpreted as implying that 
the probability of finding the particle at x is 2|)(| x .  But this is an unwarranted 
interpretation; see section 7 on the non-existence of particles.)   
 
 E. Conservation of probability.  There are two important points about 
principle 3-1. The first is that coefficients a(i) are determined by the Schrödinger 
equation.  The second is that, even though the coefficients may change in time, 
because of the special nature of the Schrödinger equation, the sum of the 
coefficients squared is always 1.  And so, from principle 3-1, the sum of the 
probabilities is always 1, exactly as it should be.  This is called conservation of 
probability.  
 
 F. Perception vs. ‘actuality.’ Because our world appears to be objective, it 
is most natural to assume there is a single, actual, objective outcome to an 
experiment.  But one is not allowed, a priori, to make that assumption when 
dealing with the interpretation of quantum mechanics.  In fact, as we indicated in 
section 2, the perceptions predicted by quantum mechanics agree quite well with 
what we actually perceive without assuming there is just a single version of reality.   
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 G. Consistency of quantum mechanics proper and the probability law. 
Principle 3-1 cannot be deduced solely from the Schrödinger equation plus the 
properties of the wave functions.  However, suppose we agree that the probability 
of perceiving outcome i is a function of |a(i)|2 so that )|)((|)( 2iafip  .  Then there 
are several ways to show that the only functional form consistent with the 
mathematics of quantum mechanics is the conventional 22 |)(|)|)((| iaiaf  .  The 
law 222 )|)((|)|)((| iaiaf  ,  for example, would give inconsistent results.  I think 
this observation, that  
 
3-2. The |a(i)|2 probability law is the only functional form consistent with 
the rest of conventional quantum mechanics. 
 
strongly suggests that the origin of the law must, to a large extent, somehow be 
within conventional quantum mechanics, even though we haven’t yet figured out 
how (see, however, section 11).  That is, it doesn’t make sense for there to be a 
probabilistic ‘mechanism’ that is entirely independent of the laws of quantum 
mechanics, but just happens to be consistent with those laws. 
 
 
 
4. The Failure of Everett’s Many-Worlds Interpretation. 
 
In Everett’s many-worlds interpretation [1], which is the bare-bones 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, it is assumed that (1) only the wave 
functions, which obey linear Schrödinger equations, exist (no particles or hidden 
variables); (2) there is no collapse of the wave function; (3) there are no ‘sentient 
beings’ outside the laws of quantum mechanics; and (in our version of Everett) (4) 
there is no a priori assumption of a probability law.  We call this set of assumptions 
QMA.   
To see the implications of these assumptions, suppose we do an 
experiment—perhaps a Stern-Gerlach experiment—on an atomic system that has n 
possible states.  Before the experiment, the system has state  
 



n
i
iia
1
|)(|                                                    (4-1) 
 
After the measurement, the detector and observer states become entangled with the 
atomic states, and the state is  
 
  

iobsiiia
n
i
,|det,||)(|
1
                                       (4-2) 
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This is the state of the universe in the many-worlds interpretation.  In it, if you are 
the observer, there are n versions of you!  There is an equally valid version of you 
perceiving each outcome so no version is singled out as the you. 
 To see if this multiple-versions-of-you gives a reasonable interpretation, 
under the assumption that our current perceptions correspond to those of one of the 
versions of the observer, we first need to check whether the perceptions of each 
version violate any of our experiential perceptual rules.  From section 2, we see that 
each version perceives a single version of reality, that two observers never disagree, 
and that successive measurements are consistent.  And from sections 5 and 6, we 
see that each version will perceive a universe that appears to be made of classical, 
localized particles.  So the many-worlds interpretation, strange as it is, appears to 
do an excellent job. 
 
 Problems with the probability law.  There is, however, one problem—the 
|a(i)|2 probability law of principle 3-1.  This law cannot hold within the many-
worlds interpretation [7].  We will give a simple form of the argument here, with 
more detailed arguments given in appendix A5. 
 We work from Eq. (4-2).  First, the only entities that perceive in QMA are 
the versions of the observer, so all statements about perception must refer to the 
perceptions of the versions of the observer.  Second, one might conjecture that only 
one version of the observer is ‘aware.’  But one can show (appendix A6) that all 
versions are equally aware.   
 Now each version, iobs,| , of the observer perceives its respective 
outcome—by looking at the corresponding version, idet,| , of the detector—with 
100% probability.  There is nothing probabilistic in the perception process; there is 
simply each equally valid version of the observer perceiving its associated 
outcome.  Thus there is no apparent way to introduce probability of perception 
(principle 3-1) into QMA. 
 One might be tempted to argue that the probability comes in the assignment 
of my perceptions to the perceptions of one of the versions; sometimes my 
perceptions correspond to those of version 1,| obs , sometimes to those of version 
2,| obs  and so on, with the probability of assignment to version iobs,|  being 
|a(i)|2.  The problem with this conjecture, however, is that when we say ‘my 
perceptions,’ we are implicitly assuming the existence of a single, unique me, 
separate from the versions.  But there is no unique me separate from the versions in 
QMA; if there are n versions, there are always n me’s.  So that interpretation cannot 
be valid.   
 
4-1. The probability law cannot hold within QMA, where all versions of the 
observer are perceptually equivalent on each run.  
 
 Further, we argue in appendix A5 that one version must be singled out as 
the one corresponding to my perceptions.   
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4-2. The probability law implies there must be some mechanism, not within 
QMA, which singles out one version of the observer as the one 
corresponding to my perceptions.   
 
 To the best of my knowledge, aside from particles (including hidden 
variables) and collapse, the only other possible singling out mechanism is the 
existence of ‘sentient beings’ whose awareness is outside the laws of quantum 
mechanics.  So principle 4-2 says there must be either be particles (hidden 
variables) or collapse or sentient beings.  Particle interpretations will be considered 
in sections 5, 6, and 7, hidden variables in section 8, collapse in section 9, and a 
sentient being interpretation will be given in section 11. 
 
 
 
5. Group Representation Theory. 
 
 In this and the next two sections, we will explore the possibility of particle 
interpretations of quantum mechanics.  We find there is no evidence for particles.  
In this section, we will show that the properties of mass, energy, momentum, spin 
and charge, which are attributed to particles in classical physics, can actually be 
shown to be properties of the wave function of quantum mechanics.  The method 
used is the mathematical discipline of group representation theory, which I will 
endeavor to explain in a way suitable for non-specialists. 
 
 Physical and mathematical invariance.  Ignoring gravity, we don’t expect 
the results of experiments to depend either upon the orientation (east-west, north-
south) or the position of the experimental apparatus.  This constitutes physical 
rotational and translational invariance (no variation in the results for changes in 
orientation or position). 
 The equations governing physical phenomena should reflect this invariance.  
Suppose we take the Schrödinger equation for the hydrogen atom.  Then it should 
be (and is) independent of how the xyz coordinates are oriented (so long as the three 
axes are perpendicular).  So the equation is invariant under any rotation of the 
coordinate system (that is, the form of the equation is the same no matter whether 
you express it in terms of the original coordinates, xyz, or in terms of the rotated 
coordinates, x´y´z´).  The set of all possible rotations, along with the rules for how 
two successive rotations give a third, constitute a mathematical entity called the 
three-dimensional rotation group. 
 
 The hydrogen atom and the invariance chain.  Because the equation for 
the hydrogen atom wave function is invariant under (the group of) rotations, the 
solutions to the equation can be classified or labeled according to their angular 
momentum, or spin as it is usually called (see appendix A2).  But this is not just a 
mathematical classification scheme.  If a Stern-Gerlach (A2)  experiment is done 
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on the atom, one actually gets different, measurable results for the different spins.  
Thus we have this interesting chain—from physical invariance (rotations shouldn’t 
matter in the outcome) to mathematical invariance to a mathematical classification 
scheme for different wave functions to an actual, physical, measurable property of 
the wave function. 
 
 The full set of physical invariances.  Physical laws are not just invariant 
under three-dimensional rotations.  They are also invariant under relativistic 
‘rotations’ in the four dimensions of space and time.  Further, they are invariant 
under translations in space and time.   
 There is also one more kind of invariance, that of the ‘internal’ symmetry 
group.  Physicists had noticed that there are certain regularities in the properties of 
the many ‘elementary’ particles discovered.  It has been found that these 
regularities correspond to invariance under a set of non-space-time rotations—for 
example rotations in a complex three dimensional space for quarks or perhaps a 
complex five [8,9] or six dimensional space if electrons and neutrinos are included. 
 
 Mass, energy, momentum, spin and charge.  As in the hydrogen atom 
case, the physical invariances lead, through the above chain of reasoning, to 
physical, measurable properties of the solutions to the invariant equations.  These 
properties are mass, energy, momentum and spin for the space-time group  [10], 
and the strong, electromagnetic and weak charges for the internal symmetry group.  
Thus all the properties—mass, …, charge—that we attributed to particles in 
classical physics are actually seen to be properties of the quantum mechanical wave 
function!! 
 
5-1. Linearity and the physical invariance properties—relativistic rotations, 
translations, internal symmetries—imply the particle-like properties of 
mass, energy, momentum, spin and charge are properties of the wave 
function. 
 
5-2. Linearity and the invariance properties also imply that the usual 
conservation laws and laws of addition for energy, momentum, spin and 
charge hold in quantum mechanics. 
 
 One might object that the quantities derived from group representation 
theory actually refer back to properties of the particles ‘associated with’ the wave 
functions.  But all the mathematical apparatus used above referred only to the wave 
functions.  There is no reason, at least on this account, to add an extra concept 
(particles) to the structure of physical existence when that concept never occurred 
in our deliberations. 
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 Significance of this result I.  It is truly astonishing that the existence of the 
centuries-old classical properties of particles, mass, …, charge, is derived in 
quantum mechanics.   
 The inputs to this derivation are the invariance principles and the linearity 
of the quantum mechanical equations.  The fact that the consequences of these 
inputs give the known properties of particles is probably as close as one can come 
to a proof that invariance and linearity are absolute principles in the description of 
physical existence. 
 
 Significance of this result II.  The fact that the classical particle-like 
properties are properties of the wave functions severely undermines the rationale 
for assuming the existence of particles. 
 
 Significance of this result III.  The physical particle-like states of quantum 
mechanics, in ket notation, are written as QsSpEm z ,,,,,|  (mass, energy, 
momentum, spin, z component of spin, and the three charges).  That is, all the 
labels on states are group representational quantities.  Further, the antisymmetry 
of fermions and the symmetric statistics of bosons are also group representational 
properties (associated with the permutation group).  This suggests that quantum 
mechanics as we know it is the representational form of an underlying, pre-
representational, linear, appropriately invariant theory (see [11]). 
 
 
 
6. Localization. 
 
 There is one particle-like property that is not related to group representation 
theory, that of localization.  Speaking classically, the carriers of mass and charge 
seem to be very small, almost point-like, with highly localized effects.  This 
particle-like localization occurs in an interesting way in quantum mechanical 
experiments.  To illustrate, suppose we have a single light wave function that goes 
through a single slit and impinges on a screen covered with film grains.  The wave 
function spreads out after going through the slit and hits many grains of film.  But 
surprisingly, a microscopic search will show that only one of the grains will be 
exposed by the light.  It is as if there were a particle of light, a photon, hidden in the 
wave function, and it is the single grain hit by the particle that is exposed. 
 As another example, suppose we have a target proton surrounded by a 
sphere coated with film grains on the inside.  An electron (electron-like wave 
function) is shot at the proton and the wave function of the electron spreads out in 
all directions, hitting every grain.  But again, a microscopic examination will show 
that one and only one grain is exposed.  As in the case of light, it is as if a 
particulate electron embedded in the wave function followed a particular trajectory 
and hit and exposed only one grain. 
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 Quantum mechanical explanation.  Surprisingly, this exposure of only 
one localized grain by a spread-out wave function can be accounted for strictly 
from the principles of quantum mechanics, without invoking the existence of 
particles.  It depends on the linearity of the theory. 
 We suppose in the electron scattering example that there is an interaction, 
represented by V in the equations below, of the electron wave function, elec| , with 
each of the N grains, gr| .  Just before the wave function hits the grains, we can 
schematically write the state and electron-grain interaction as 
 
 
 







NgrNgrVelecgrgr
NgrgrgrVelecgr
NgrgrgrgrVelec
NgrgrgrNgrVelec
NgrgrgrgrVelec
NgrgrgrgrVelec
NgrgrNgrVgrVelec
||)(|...21|
...|...2|)2(|1|
|...2|1|)1(|
|...2|1|)(|
...|...2|1|)2(|
|...2|1|)1(|
|...1|)(...)1(|
                (6-1) 
 
where we have used allowable rules of re-arrangement of the N terms to arrive at 
the final form.  In the first term of the last three lines, the electron wave function, 
through the grain 1 interaction term, interacts with and exposes only grain 1.  In the 
second, only grain 2 is exposed, …, and in the last term, only grain N is exposed.  
Thus the final state is (with the asterisk indicating an exposed grain) 
 
*||...2|1|
...|...*2|2|1|
|...2|*1|1|



NgrNgrinelecgrgr
Ngrgrgrinelecgr
Ngrgrgrgrinelec
                        (6-2) 
 
[We have assumed that in each term, the electron—or rather a portion of the 
electron-like wave function—ends up lodged in the exposed grain.  Note 
that the small portion of the electron-like wave function that lodges in each 
grain carries the full mass, charge and spin that we associate with an 
electron—see appendix A7—so that each of the N versions of reality has 
the correct charge and spin.]   
 
That is, there are N terms and only one grain is exposed in each term.  But we 
know from section 2 that only one term will be perceived.  And since each term has 
just one grain exposed (no matter what the size of the grains), only one localized 
grain will be perceived as exposed, even though the electron wave function hits all 
the grains!  Thus 
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6-1.  A spread-out wave function produces localized effects. 
 
 It is remarkable that quantum mechanics alone, with no assumption of the 
existence of particles, can imitate, in our perceptions, the classical idea of a 
localized (only one localized grain exposed) particle. 
 
 Particle-like trajectories. In cloud and bubble chambers, a spread-out 
wave function is found to produce more or less continuous, particle-like 
trajectories.  Reasoning similar to the above, applied several times, shows this also 
follows from quantum mechanics alone.  (The ‘continuity’ follows because the 
wave functions of successive nucleation centers are entangled; in each term, the 
next nucleation center ‘nucleates’ only if the previous one nucleated.) 
 
 
 
7. No Evidence for Particles. 
Wave-Particle Duality. 
 
 
If one ignores some of the principles of sections 2 through 6, as is often 
done in interpretations, one way of attempting to explain why we perceive only one 
of the versions of reality given by quantum mechanics, and why our world appears 
particle-like, is to suppose that the wave function is not the physical reality we 
perceive.  Instead there is an actual, unique physical existence, made up perhaps of 
particles, which rides along within just one of the versions, and it is that physical 
reality that we perceive.  This, in fact, is the view of the majority of scientists and 
non-scientists alike.  If you look in a typical modern physics text, you will find 
analyses of experiments—the Compton and photoelectric effects, for example—
which reputedly prove particles are necessary for understanding physical existence.   
But the problem with these arguments is that they do not take into account 
all the properties—well-known and not so well-known—of the wave function.  If 
these are taken into account, then one can show that all the particle-like properties 
can be explained by properties of the wave function alone.  
 
A. Wave-particle duality.  It is useful to approach this from the 
perspective of wave-particle duality.  The classically wave-like and classically 
particle-like properties of matter are: 
 
Wave-like properties. 
Diffraction (single slit) 
Interference (double slit) 
Properties of a fraction of a wave. 
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Particle-like properties. 
Mass, energy, momentum, spin. 
Charge. 
Localization and particle-like trajectories. 
 
 B. Wave-like properties.  The first two wave-like properties follow for the 
wave function from the linearity of the quantum equations of motion.  The third 
property, however, is interesting because it differs for classical waves and the wave 
function.  In a classical wave, a water wave or sound wave, for example, a small 
part of the wave carries only a correspondingly small part of the energy and 
momentum of the wave.  But it is shown in appendix A7 that 
 
 7-1. A small part of a wave function carries the full mass, spin, charge, 
energy and momentum.   
 
 What about light waves, which correspond both to classical waves and to 
photon-like wave functions?  A portion of a classical light wave, say a beam of 
light, is composed of many millions of photon-like wave functions.  And so it is 
indeed true that a portion of the beam carries a corresponding portion of the energy 
and momentum because it carries a portion of the ‘photons’.  But for a single 
photon wave function, a small portion of it carries the full energy and momentum.  
(Energy and momentum add across products of wave functions in quantum 
mechanics, but not across sums.) 
 
 C. Particle-like properties.  We have already shown in sections 5 and 6 
that the classical particle-like properties are actually properties of the wave 
functions.   
 
 D. Compton scattering and the photoelectric effect.  Perhaps the most 
convincing ‘evidence’ for the existence of particles comes from these two 
experiments, which both involve the interaction between light and electrons.  In it, 
if one assumes there are particulate electrons and photons that carry energy and 
momentum, and if one employs conservation of energy and momentum, then one 
can explain the experimental results.  But we have seen that energy and momentum 
are properties of the wave functions, and that the conservation laws also hold in 
quantum mechanics.  These, combined with the third property of waves for wave 
functions (a portion of the wave carries the full energy and momentum), are 
sufficient to derive the Compton and photoelectric results without assuming the 
existence of particles (either photons or electrons).  Thus, because quantum 
mechanics alone, without the presumption of particles, can explain Compton 
scattering and the photoelectric effect, these two experimental results do not 
provide evidence for the existence of particles.   
 The same conclusion holds for all other experiments that allegedly give 
evidence for the existence of particles.  Thus, 
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7-2.  There is no evidence for the existence of particles. 
 
And since there is no evidence, there is no reason to assume particles exist. 
 E. Nomenclature.  Even though there is no evidence for particles, it is not 
necessary to give up the very useful names.  So we can agree that an ‘electron’ 
refers to an electron-like wave function, having mass em , spin ½, charge, e ; and 
a ‘photon’ refers to a photon-like wave function having mass 0, spin 1, and charge 
0.  But we must keep in mind that these names do not (if there is no collapse) refer 
to entities that objectively exist in a unique state; there can be several versions of 
them simultaneously existing in different states. 
 F. Related experiments.  There are several experiments that, if one 
assumes particles exist, give perplexing results.  Bell-like experiments (appendix 
A8) [12,13] on non-locality seem to show that particles interact instantaneously at a 
distance.  And Wheeler’s delayed-choice experiment (A9) [14,15] and the quantum 
eraser experiment (A10) [16,17] seem to imply that causality can sometimes work 
backwards in time.  But if one assumes there are no particles, the very peculiar 
inferences about the nature of reality simply evaporate, as is shown in appendices 
A9 and A10.   In a no-particle world, there is (to the best of my knowledge) no 
evidence for backwards causality.  And while there are non-local effects in 
quantum mechanics, built into the theory by entanglement, there is no faster-than-
light signaling required to explain the results; it is just quantum mechanics as usual. 
 
 
 
8. Hidden Variable Interpretations. 
 
 It has been conjectured that even though one cannot show there are 
particles, there may still be ‘hidden’ (not detectable by experiment) variables that 
determine the unique outcome of an experiment, the outcome we perceive.  At a 
given time, there is only one, unique set of these hidden variables (as opposed to 
the many versions of reality of the wave function), so they are objective.   
 The first observation is that 
 
8-1. There is no experimental evidence for hidden variables. 
 
Second, there is no definitive proof that there cannot be a hidden variable theory 
underlying quantum mechanics.  And third, there is no acceptable hidden variable 
theory at this time, and one encounters severe difficulties in attempting to construct 
a satisfactory underlying theory. 
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 Bohm’s model.  The most nearly successful hidden variable theory is that 
of Bohm [18,19].  Although it falls short, there are several reasons for presenting it.  
First, it is successful in achieving its goal if one ignores certain shortcomings.  
Second, it is pretty much the only even minimally acceptable hidden variable 
model.  Third, any acceptable hidden variable theory would presumably have to 
reduce to Bohm’s model in many situations.  And fourth, it serves as a testing 
ground for conjectured ‘no-go’ theorems—arguments which purport to prove that 
hidden variables are impossible. 
 In this model, Bohm derived a set of trajectories through space from the 
Schrödinger equation (the velocity of the trajectory through point x is essentially 
the gradient of the phase angle, )(x , of the wave function).  He then assumed that 
for each ‘particle-like’ wave function, a ‘particle’ was put on one of the trajectories.  
This particle then followed a very complex trajectory.  The hidden variables in this 
case are the position and velocity of the particle. 
 To explain the success of the theory, we will use the example of a Stern-
Gerlach experiment [20] (see appendix A2) on a spin 1 particle (particle-like wave 
function).  The z-component of spin of this wave function can take on the three 
values 1,0,1  .  When this wave function is shot through a magnetic field, the three 
parts of the wave function each follow separate trajectories, so the wave function, 
schematically, is 
 
)()1()()0()()1( 101 xaxaxa                            (8-1) 
 
where the different wave functions ),(),(),( 101 xxx  correspond to the 
different trajectories.  For each run of the experiment, the probability law tells us 
that the probability of the particle following trajectory i is 2|)(| ia . 
 We now suppose the spin 1 particle consists of two spin 0 particles in a 
bound state (like the electron and proton in a hydrogen atom, ignoring the spin ½ ) 
and apply the Bohm model to this situation.  Before the particle reaches the 
magnetic field, the two particles bound together will follow trajectories that move 
very rapidly through the three possible spin 1 states.  And then at the magnetic 
field, the trajectory of the bound state will follow just one of the three possible 
paths.  The success of Bohm’s model is that it predicts that path i will be followed a 
fraction 2|)(| ia  of the time, so that the probability law is satisfied. 
 Now, for the problems with the model.  First, it is not relativistic, and 
because of the way in which time is used, it is difficult to generalize it to a 
relativistic formulation.  Second, there are as-yet-unsolved problems in handling 
the creation and annihilation of particles.  Third, one must assume a specialized 
initial density of trajectories in order to obtain the probability law, and there is no 
clear reason why nature should choose that density.   
 Fourth, it is an arbitrary feature of the model that a particle is put on just 
one of the trajectories.  There is nothing in the mathematics that prevents there 
being two particles, on two different trajectories, associated with a ‘single particle’ 
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wave function [21].  And it is extremely difficult to reformulate the Bohm model 
with a ‘source’ equation which forces there to be one and only one particle 
associated with a single particle wave function [21]. 
 Finally, there is the problem of perception.  The wave function does not 
collapse and so there is a valid quantum state of the observer’s brain corresponding 
to each outcome.  There is nothing in the mathematics of the theory which says that 
only the version of the brain associated with the particle is ‘consciously aware.’  To 
put it conversely, an acceptable no-collapse hidden variable theory must give a 
convincing reason for why the non-particled quantum versions of the observer are 
not aware.  Such a reason is not given in the Bohm model, and I don’t believe it can 
be given in any hidden variable model.  Thus we have  
 
8-2*. It appears to be very difficult, perhaps impossible, to explain in any 
non-collapse hidden variable model why the quantum versions of the brain 
not associated with the hidden variables cannot be consciously aware. 
 
with this principle being less certain than the others, hence the asterisk.  One cannot 
simply say “Well, that’s just the way Nature works” because, in ‘being-less’ hidden 
variable schemes, there is no arbiter, no outside intelligence that could make the 
choice between particled and not-particled quantum versions.  And there is nothing 
that is aware of only particles or their state (and the particles themselves are not 
assumed to be aware).  There is not even a current understanding of what conscious 
awareness is to base one’s argument on. 
 If one takes a different tack and conjectures that the hidden variables change 
the structure of the ‘particled’ quantum version of the brain in some subtle way, 
that is a whole different kind of hidden variable theory.  It runs up against the 
successes of no-hidden-variable quantum mechanics. 
    
 The Kochen-Specker reasoning.  Kochen and Specker [22], and later 
Conway and Kochen [23], used a most elegant argument in an attempt to show that 
it is not possible to have an underlying hidden variable theory.  The primary 
characteristic of a hidden variable theory is that,  
8A. Once the hidden variables (whatever they are) are set, the outcome of 
any experiment is determined.   
Kochen and Specker then showed that for certain sets of experiments, this leads to 
a contradiction.   That is, they claim it is logically impossible to satisfy principle 
8A in every situation!  If this is correct and free of hidden assumptions, then it 
would constitute a welcome proof (certainty is sometimes hard to come by in the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics) that there could be no hidden variable theory. 
 The problem is that there is an apparent counter-example, the Bohm model, 
to the K-S-C no-go theorem for hidden variables.  For this reason, I believe that K-
S-C did indeed make a hidden assumption that would appear to invalidate their 
result unless they can work around it.  The argument is given in detail in appendix 
A11, but the gist of it is that they implicitly assume the hidden variables are the 
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only quantities that determine the outcome of a measurement, and that is not 
correct. 
 Thus, as far as I know, even though the construction of a satisfactory 
underlying hidden variable theory is fraught with difficulties, and is probably not 
possible, there is no proof (under acceptable assumptions) that it cannot be done.  
(See appendix A8 for a non-local restriction of sorts imposed on hidden variable 
theories by Bell-like experiments.) 
 
 
 
9. Collapse Interpretations. 
 
 Another way of attempting to explain why we perceive only one version of 
reality is to suppose that the wave function somehow collapses down to just one 
version [4].  In Schrödinger’s cat, for example, the dead cat version of reality might 
collapse to zero—that is, it would simply go out of existence—leaving just the live 
cat version to be perceived.   
 There have been a number of searches for experimental evidence of 
collapse, including interference effects for large molecules, SQUID experiments, 
and constraints set by nuclear processes [24-26].  But none of them has found any 
evidence whatsoever for collapse.   
 
9-1. In spite of a number of attempts, no experimental evidence for collapse 
has been found. 
 
(Note also section 3F.  The simple fact that we perceive only one version of reality 
does not constitute experimental evidence that the others have collapsed to zero.) 
 
 Mathematical theories of collapse.  The primary (and just about the only) 
mathematical theory of collapse is the one proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini, Weber, 
[27]and Pearle [28].  A random force is introduced into the time evolution of the 
wave function in such a way that, after a short period of time, a microsecond or less 
for systems with many particles, there is a collapse of the wave function down to 
just one version (without affecting the ‘shape’ of the wave function).  The 
coefficients of all the other versions effectively shrink to zero, so those versions 
simply go out of existence.  This idea is beautifully implemented in the Pearle 
model.  But even though the mathematics is elegant, there are difficulties with the 
physical implications of the scheme [26]:  
•There must be instantaneous coordination of billions of random events 
located far from each other (and for that reason, one is currently not able to 
make the theory relativistic).   
•The coordination extends across versions, which is strictly forbidden in 
conventional quantum mechanics, because versions don’t communicate. 
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•The random event ‘chosen’ at time t depends on the results of the choice at 
time t, (rather than at time dtt   as is usual in a physically applicable 
differential equation) which seems physically awkward. 
•The linearity of quantum mechanics must be abandoned (appendix A12), 
which runs counter to the group representational analysis in section 4, as 
well as to all the successes of quantum mechanics.   
• The specific Pearle method of collapse, using particle number, doesn’t 
work in all situations.   
• Finally, the specific and very specialized form assumed (not derived) for 
the randomizing Hamiltonian just happens to give the |a(i)|2 probability law 
which agrees with the rest of quantum mechanics (see principle 3-2 and the 
comment at the end of section 3). 
Because there are no other serious candidates for a mathematical theory of collapse, 
and also because some or all of these problems would be expected to occur for any 
model, there is currently no reason to suppose that mathematically implemented 
collapse is the solution to the problem of perception of only one version of reality. 
[Actually the problem is not the perception of only one version—see section 
2; the problem is why the probability law holds.  The GRW-P model does 
indeed give the probability law, but it has the problems just described.] 
 
 Collapse by conscious perception.  To summarize the reasoning of section 
7, we have seen that there is no evidence for the existence of anything besides the 
wave function.  We have also seen that there is no experimental or theoretical 
evidence for a mathematical theory of collapse to just one version.  And yet we 
know from section 4 that one version must be singled out for perception, by some 
means, if the probability law is to hold.  One possible singling out mechanism, the 
one addressed here, is that there is indeed collapse, but it is initiated by conscious 
perception, rather than by a mathematical process based on random variables 
[4,29]. 
 However, because an instantaneous collapse ,  jiai || , suspends the 
usual Schrödinger equation mathematics for an instant, this option has the 
disadvantage that the conscious perception of a human being—a slippery concept, 
subject to wandering attention, impaired perception and so on—disrupts the 
mathematics.  Further, the collapse changes the wave function in such a way that 
even though the Schrödinger equation has been suspended, the wave function is 
still a solution to the equation when it comes out the other side of the collapse.  In 
addition this instantaneous process adheres to the probability law, collapsing to 
state j|  on a fraction 2|)(| ja of the runs.  This creates difficulties which are 
discussed in appendix A13.  This consciousness-triggered intervention in the 
mathematics, tailored to the situation with no apparent way of verifying the 
assumptions, and with no explanation for why the ‘collapsing agent’ adheres to the 
probability law (see principle 3-2), does not seem to me to be a likely way for 
Nature to proceed.   
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 Thus we have the following principle: 
 
9-2. There is currently no reason to be at all optimistic that there is a theory 
of collapse which augments standard quantum mechanics. 
 
 
 Decoherence and Consistent Histories ‘Interpretations.’  The ideas of 
decoherence [30,31] were not meant as an interpretation but they are sometimes 
construed that way.  In decoherence, the environment often causes a system to 
collapse to just one version.  But the environment cannot do that in general.  
Suppose we do a Stern-Gerlach experiment on a spin ½ silver atom.  As soon as the 
wave function of the silver atom separates into two non-overlapping parts (as it 
goes through the magnetic field), the universe is divided into two separate, non-
interacting versions (see appendix A3), each of which keeps its same norm (same 
size, same coefficient).  Nothing in the detectors or the environment in general can 
change the norms of the two parts once they separate.  Thus there can be no 
collapse.  There is therefore no singling out mechanism, and so the physical process 
of decoherence cannot provide a satisfactory interpretation of quantum mechanics.  
The same is true for Consistent Histories [32]; it provides no singling out 
mechanism in the above example. 
 
 Penrose’s gravitational collapse.  Penrose [33] proposed the following (in 
connection with a theory of consciousness):  Suppose we again do the Stern-
Gerlach experiment so there are two versions of the detecting apparatus and the 
observer.  Since the arrangement of atoms is slightly different in the two versions, 
the definition of space and time—which depends on the distribution of matter—
will be slightly different in the two versions.  Penrose supposed that difference 
caused a ‘tear’ in the fabric of space-time.  This tear would lead to a force that 
would pull the two versions together, thus causing a collapse to just one of them.  
But this inter-version force violates the principle that versions are in separate 
universes which cannot influence one another.  So unless Penrose can show why 
this separate-universe principle doesn’t hold, I don’t believe his interpretation can 
be valid.  
 
 
 
10. Implications of the Principles. 
 
 The interpretation we will consider in section 11 makes use of a “Mind” 
outside the laws of the physical universe.  So, to motivate this radical step, and also 
to bring some order to the interpretive problem, we will review our results so far.  
The question to be answered is: What underlying conceptual picture of reality can 
best link our perceptions with the mathematics of quantum mechanics?   
 We start with the principle  
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10-1. Physical reality consists of the wave function alone. 
 
To me, the evidence is overwhelming that physical reality consists of the wave 
function alone.  The particle-like properties of mass, energy, momentum, spin, 
charge and localization all follow from the principles of quantum mechanics alone.  
And principle 2-2, that one version of the wave function always agrees exactly with 
our perceptions, makes it a virtual certainty. 
 This implies that interpretations which postulate a real classical world are 
not likely to prove fruitful.   
 Further, there are interpretations in which it is assumed that quantum 
mechanics gives only statistical information, or information about how we get from 
one state to another, but they do not say anything about the nature of the matter 
itself.  I believe such interpretations are unnecessarily conservative.  Further, they 
do not give sufficient weight to the non-statistical or ‘absolute’ facts that quantum 
mechanics implies matter has mass, charge, quantized spin, and is perceived as 
localized; and that it gives accurate energy levels for composite systems.   
 So we will suppose that the only interpretations worth considering at this 
point are those in which physical reality consists of the wave function alone.  This 
is not a done deal, because there is no proof that hidden variables do not exist, or 
that there is no collapse.  But in view of our review of the current state of physics, 
it seems like a quite reasonable assumption. 
 Can we use physics to infer the nature of reality?  There is a point of 
view which says that, because we don’t directly perceive anything other than our 
macroscopic world, we have no business inferring anything about the true nature of 
reality from quantum mechanics.  I just don’t buy this no-inference-allowed 
argument.  In fact, I think it works better in reverse. What we are directly aware of 
corresponds solely to our neural representation of reality.  But mathematical 
physics, the distillation of the results of millions of experiments (with experiments 
just being disciplined, organized perceptions), gives a much more detailed, in-
depth, and unified picture of the physical world than our sense-based view.  Thus 
the picture of the physical world that mathematical physics gives us—that we live 
in a world made of wave functions (see also reference [11] on an underlying 
theory)—is more likely to correspond to a scheme which is closer to the ‘actual 
nature’ of reality than the everyday picture given by our neural representation. 
 
 A second major principle is 
 
10-2. It is quite reasonable to assume there is no collapse. 
 
This follows from our observation that there is no experimental evidence for 
collapse, from the difficulties encountered in attempting to construct a valid 
mathematical theory of collapse, and from the questionable suggestion that collapse 
is based on conscious perception. 
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 Third,  
 
10-3. Even if there is no collapse and there are no hidden variables, the 
probability law implies there must be some ‘mechanism’ which singles 
out one version for perception on each run. 
 
And fourth, 
 
10-4. Since there is no singling out mechanism in basic quantum 
mechanics (the QMA of section 4), the mechanism for singling out the 
perceived version of reality must be outside the laws of basic quantum 
mechanics. 
 
 Given 10-1 and 10-2, I can think of only one way to single out one version.  
It is to suppose there is a “Mind,” outside the laws of quantum mechanics, which is 
the source of the awareness necessary for perception.  One version of this, the 
Mind-MIND interpretation, is given in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
11. The Mind-MIND Interpretation. 
 
 The arguments given in sections 5 through 8 show we can be quite 
(although not absolutely) certain there are no particles or hidden variables.  And the 
arguments in section 9 indicate we can be fairly certain there is no mathematical or 
consciousness-triggered collapse.  We thus arrive at the following set of ‘idealized’ 
requirements on an interpretation. 
 
11-1. There are no particles or hidden variables. 
 
11-2. There is no collapse. 
 
11-3. One version must be singled out as the one corresponding to my 
perceptions on each run (from section 4). 
 
 How do we proceed from here?  To see, suppose we go back to principle  
2-2—that that our perceptions always correspond exactly to those of one and only 
one version of the observer.  It is as if there is a “Mind,” outside the laws of 
quantum mechanics, that is, in some sense, concentrating on and perceiving one 
quantum version of physical reality.  This supposition forms the basis for the Mind-
MIND interpretation. 
 
 
A. Basics of the Mind-MIND Interpretation  
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1. The non-physical Mind. Associated with each individual person is an 
individual Mind that is not subject to the mathematical laws of quantum 
mechanics.  In particular, the Mind has no wave function associated with it.  
We use a capital M to distinguish this Mind from the usual usage of the 
word mind.  Because quantum mechanics describes the physical world so 
well, we will define anything outside its laws to be ‘non-physical.’  So with 
this definition, the Mind is non-physical.  
 
2. The Mind perceives only the brain-body. The individual Mind 
perceives only the wave function of the individual brain (brain-body); it 
does not directly perceive the quantum state of the external world.  This is 
consistent with the fact that we are not directly aware of the external world; 
we are only aware of the neural state of our brain.  The process of 
perception of the wave function by the Mind is not understood.  
 
3. The Mind picks out one version of the wave function. The individual 
Mind concentrates on one version of the wave function of the brain-body, 
and it is the concentrated-upon version that enters our conventional 
awareness.   
 
4. No collapse. The Mind does not collapse the wave function or interfere 
with the mathematics in any way.   
A primary objection to dualism—a non-physical Mind separate from 
a physical brain-body—is that the non-physical aspect must exert a 
force or otherwise have some effect on the physical world.  The 
Mind scheme circumvents this objection because the non-physical 
aspect only perceives; it does not affect the physical world (which is 
made up of wave functions) in any way. 
 
B. Agreement among Observers. 
The Overarching MIND. 
The model as it has been given so far leaves two important questions 
unanswered—why observers agree on what they perceive, and why the probability 
law holds.  To make the first question specific, consider again the Schrödinger’s cat 
experiment and suppose we have two observers.  Then according to the rules of 
quantum mechanics, the wave function is 
 
[cat alive] 
[obs 1’s brain state corresponds to cat alive] 
[obs 2’s brain state corresponds to cat alive] 
                                                           —and— 
[cat dead] 
[obs 1’s brain state corresponds to cat dead] 
[obs 2’s brain state corresponds to cat dead] 
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Suppose observer 1’s Mind focuses on the version of the associated brain 
corresponding to cat alive so that observer 1 perceives, in the everyday sense, a live 
cat.  We know from everyday experience that observer 1 and observer 2 (and the 
cat) must be in agreement.  And we know from property 2-4 that two observers can 
never disagree.  But still, how do we guarantee in our Mind model, that observer 
2’s Mind is also focused on the ‘alive’ version of its brain?  There is a way to bring 
about agreement but it is bound to make scientists even more skeptical of this 
proposal because it is far outside the realm of contemporary science. 
 
5. The overarching MIND. Instead of each individual Mind being separate 
from all others, each Mind is a fragment or facet of a single overarching 
MIND.  Each individual Mind is that aspect of MIND that is responsible for 
perceiving the state of the associated individual physical brain.  
Concentration of perception on a particular version of the wave function by 
one individual Mind is then presumed to set the concentration of perception 
on that same version by the overarching MIND.  And that in turn sets the 
perception of the same version by all the other individual Minds.  Neither 
the MIND nor the individual Minds alter the wave function in any way.   
 
 So to obtain conscious agreement among observers in this scheme, we are 
forced to substitute the MIND assumption for the conventional particle or collapse 
assumptions that give a single-version physical world.  The scientist will say there 
is no evidence to justify such an outrageously non-scientific assumption.  But the 
counter-argument is that there is no evidence to justify the particle or collapse 
schemes either.  And if there is no collapse and there are no particles—the option 
we are exploring here—we are apparently forced to a “Mind” interpretation.  
Agreement among observers then forces us to the Mind-MIND scheme. 
 
 Freedom of choice.  Freedom of choice enters the Mind-MIND 
interpretation in the sense that the individual Mind can choose to perceive any 
possible internal quantum state—states in which the branches are branches of the 
brain wave function alone; that is, the freedom applies to thoughts and preparations 
for muscular actions.  (See appendix A14 for the argument that the brain has many 
simultaneously existing internal quantum states.)  But this freedom of choice of the 
individual Mind does not apply to external events, where the branching includes 
objects besides the brain.  We cannot choose to perceive a live Schrödinger’s cat 
instead of a dead one, nor can we choose to perceive a decayed nucleus instead of 
an undecayed one. 
 
C. The Probability Law. 
There is a problem with the concept of probability if we assume no particles 
and no collapse.  Probability as it is traditionally understood, say in the dice-rolling 
example, refers to the probability of a specific, actual, ‘single-version’ event; there 
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is an actual die that has a specific reading after each roll.  But in quantum 
mechanics, the wave function does not give a specific, actual, single-version event; 
instead, it gives several versions of reality (equivalent to all six readings of the die 
occurring at the same time), each potentially corresponding to an ‘actual, 
perceived’ event.  So the direct use of classical probability is not appropriate in the 
Mind interpretation, where all versions exist forever.  (See also section 4.)   
In spite of this problem, there is a way to salvage the probability law in the 
Mind-MIND scheme.  To do this, we make the following (relatively weak) 
assumption: 
 
6. Probability. The overarching MIND is ‘much more likely’ to perceive a 
version of reality that has a much larger norm than other versions.  The 
MIND doesn’t have to follow the usual 2|)(| ia  probability law or any stable 
probability law at all; it just has to be much more likely to perceive those 
versions with a relatively large norm. 
 
To see how this leads to the 2|)(| ia  probability law, suppose we do a spin ½ Stern-
Gerlach experiment (appendix A2) N times, with N large.  The amplitude for spin 
(+ ½) is a1 and that for spin (– ½) is a2.  Then if the observer observes only the end 
result—and not the intermediate ones—the amplitude squared for perceiving m (+ 
½) spins and N – m (– ½) spins is 
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A simple calculation using Stirling’s approximation for the factorials shows that the 
amplitude squared has a sharp maximum, as a function of m, at m=N|a1|2 , so the 
amplitude squared for m near the maximum is much larger than the amplitude 
squared for m not near the maximum.  Thus according to property 6, the perceived 
result will have m near the maximum at N|a1|2.  (See also appendix A15.) 
 
It is worth emphasizing two points here.   
•The probability law in the Mind-MIND interpretation only pertains to a 
large number of repetitions of the experiment (which, of course, is pretty 
much true in classical probability theory also). 
•The probability law for long runs holds in the Mind-MIND interpretation 
only if individual results are not observed (which is quite different from 
classical probability theory).   
 
The second point is most interesting because it implies this view of the 
probability law can be experimentally tested.  Suppose the Stern-Gerlach (or some 
other) experiment is carried out in such a way that the observer perceives the 
outcome of every run.  Then if the above holds, it is possible, indeed likely, that 
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after many runs of the experiment, the average value of m/N could be relatively far 
from |a1|2.  For further comments on this possibility, see appendix A15. 
 
The MIND must perceive the magnitude of the coefficients.  There is 
one more observation here.  In the last problem considered in appendix A13, we 
noted that, to obtain information on the coefficients, the collapsing ‘mechanism’ 
must ‘perceive’ the whole wave function, not just that of the brain.  In our scheme, 
this means that for events external to the brain—Schrödinger’s cat, nuclear decay—
it must be the overarching MIND that perceives the whole wave function and then 
decides which version to concentrate on.  (Remember there is no collapse here, so 
no interference effects inadvertently get wiped out.)  But the individual Mind—a 
restricted aspect of the MIND—can still perceive just the brain wave function and 
then decide on which internal state of the brain (that is, which thought) to 
concentrate on.  
 
D. Related Thoughts. 
 The many-minds interpretation: In the many-minds interpretation of 
Albert and Loewer [34,35], there is a continuous infinity of minds associated with 
each observer.  Each of these minds chooses to perceive one or the other branch at 
random, according to the 2|)(| ia  probability law.  And so, assuming our current 
perceptions correspond to those of one of the continuous infinity of minds, we 
would seem to arrive at the probability law—our perceptions are more likely to 
correspond to a state with large 2|)(| ia because more minds have chosen that state. 
 But that is not correct.  Suppose we have a two-state system with 
8.|)2(|,2.|)1(| 22  aa .  There is a continuous infinity of minds that perceive each 
outcome.  But even though four minds choose state 2 for every one that chooses 
state 1, the same number of minds choose each.  Why?  Because of the way 
infinities work; four times infinity is still just infinity.  Or to say it another way, 
there are the same number, 1 , of points on a line from 0 to .2 as there are on a line 
from .2 to 1.  Thus, because the ‘same number’ of minds perceives each possibility, 
the many-minds interpretation cannot account for the probability law. 
 
 Mindless hulks.  One of the main reasons Albert and Loewer proposed 
their complex many-minds scheme was to avoid mindless hulks—versions of the 
observer with no associated Mind.  But I don’t see them as a problem.  The 
‘enlivening’ principle in a being is the non-physical Mind.  When the Mind does 
not focus on a particular version of the observer, that version reverts to the same 
status as any other mindless object, such as a detector; it just evolves according to 
quantum mechanical laws.  The same is true, of course, for the “Minded” version.  
But the Mind associated with the “Minded” version keeps making decisions about 
which branch constitutes ‘reality,’ and that is what makes it alive.  The Mind is “the 
fire in the equations .” (Actually it is the fire outside the equations.)  Note that we 
have no sentient beings (the version ‘inhabited’ by the Mind) talking to mindless 
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hulks (the versions not inhabited) in the Mind-MIND interpretation because each 
individual Mind and the overarching MIND all concentrate on the same version. 
 
 Panpsychism.  One potential solution to the problem of consciousness is to 
suppose that matter itself contains or carries intelligence and awareness.  But if 
physical reality consists of the wave function alone, with no collapse, this solution 
runs into difficulties.  Panpsychism, under these conditions, would seem to require 
that each version of a particle wave function has its own intelligence.  Further, the 
intelligences of the different versions would have to cooperate, in accord with the 
probability law, to somehow single out just one version (as required by the 
arguments of section 4) as the perceived version.  This seems awkward.   
 
 Quantum Jumps. (“If we have to go on with these damned quantum 
jumps, then I’m sorry that I ever got involved.”  Schrödinger.)  Suppose one does a 
spin ½ Stern-Gerlach experiment (appendix A2).  Then it appears that the state 
jumps  from a quantum state in which the wave function is in both states to a 
quantum state in which the wave function is in only one state, say the + ½ state.  
But that is not true in the Mind-Mind interpretation; the quantum state remains a 
linear combination (no collapse) so there is no jump.  The only thing that is 
relevant is our perception of the quantum state; we perceive it in one state or 
another. 
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12. Summary. 
 
 In sections 2 through 9, we have given 21 principles that need to be taken 
into account in constructing a valid interpretive scheme for relating the 
mathematics of quantum mechanics to our perceptions.  And we have shown how 
these relate to various interpretations.  Here, we give the most important points in 
tabular form.  The left column represents basic principles and the right column, 
consequences. 
 
     Each version of reality  
     is in a separate universe. 
 
Linearity.    There is a version of the observer 
     in each potential version of reality. 
Many versions 
of reality.    We perceive only one 
     version of reality. 
 
     One version of reality always 
     matches our perceptions. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
One quantum version always  
matches our perceptions. 
 
‘Separate universes’ 
implies localization. 
 
Group representation theory  No evidence 
implies mass, charge, etc.  for particles. 
belong to the wave function. 
 
Small parts of the wave 
function carry the full  
energy and momentum. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Linearity, unreasonable  No evidence 
interactions, unfruitful   for collapse. 
experimental search. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
     The many-worlds interpretation  
The probability law.   cannot accommodate probability 
     so it is not valid. 
 32 
 Now, given the principles and the current state of physics, we list our ‘most 
reasonable’ constraints on an interpretation.  The Mind-MIND interpretation is one 
way to satisfy all these constraints.  In that interpretation, each individual has an 
associated Mind, outside the laws of quantum mechanics, which perceives just one 
version of the individual’s brain wave function.  And each individual Mind is an 
aspect of a single over-arching MIND.  This interpretation has the bonus that, with 
one additional weak assumption, the probability law is automatically satisfied, in 
accord with principle 3-2. 
 
One quantum version always  
matches our perceptions. 
 
No particles or 
hidden variables; 
only the wave function.   
     The Mind-MIND Probability is a conse-  
No collapse, mathematical or  interpretation. quence, not an input. 
perceptual, so the Schrödinger      
equation always holds.    
      
One version is singled out    
(required by the probability law). 
 
Communicating versions of two 
observers must be on an equal par. 
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Appendices. 
 
A1. The Polarization of Photons. 
 
 A photon is the name given to a ‘piece’ of light.  In this treatment, where it 
is assumed (see section 7) there are no particles, it refers to a wave function with 
mass 0, spin 1, and charge 0.  Each photon (wave function) travels at the speed of 
light.  If it has wavelength  , its energy is /hc  and its momentum is /h  where 
c is the speed of light and  h is Planck’s constant. 
 
 Each photon has two possible states of polarization, which is analogous to 
spin or angular momentum.  This can be visualized in the following way:  A photon 
can be thought of (at least classically) as consisting of oscillating electric and 
magnetic fields.  If a photon is traveling in the z direction, its electric field can 
either oscillate in the x direction, so the photon is represented by x| , or its electric 
field can be oscillating in the y direction, so it is represented by y| .  These are the 
two states of polarization. 
 
 It can also be polarized so its electric field oscillates in any direction, say at 
an angle   to the x axis.  In that case, the photon state can be represented as a 
(linear) combination of the x|  and y| , 
 
 yxph |sin|cos,|                                       (A1-1) 
 
There are certain materials (such as Polaroid) that act as filters in that they let 
through only that part of the photon polarized in a certain direction.  In terms of the 
wave function, if we have a polarizer ],[ xP that lets through only x|  photons, then 
 
 xxPph |cos],[,|                                           (A1-2) 
 
 What this translates into experimentally is the following: Suppose we have 
a beam of light that contains N photons in state A1-1 crossing a given plane per 
sec, each moving at the speed of light.  Then a 100% efficient detector put in the 
beam will record N ‘hits’ per second.  But if we put an x polarizer in the beam, the 
detector will record only 2cosN  hits per second.  And if we put in a y polarizer, 
the detector will record only 2sinN  hits per second. 
 
 Thus the polarization state of Eq. (A1-1) acts as if it were composed of both 
a photon polarized in the x direction and a photon polarized in the y direction.  But 
if we measure, we find an x|  photon on a fraction 2cos  of the measurements 
and a y| photon on a fraction 2sin  of the measurements.  Not so easy to 
understand! 
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 There are crystals that can separate the photon into its x and y polarization 
parts, so that the x polarized part travels on one path and the y polarized part travels 
on another path.  One can put a detector in each path, and one can have an observer 
that looks at each detector.  If we send a single photon, in state (A1-1), through this 
apparatus, the wave function is still a sum: 
 


yesynoxObsyesyDetnoxDetx
noyyesxObsnoyDetyesxDetxstate
;,|,|,||sin
;,|,|,||cos|


        (A1-3) 
 
But now the whole ‘universe,’ photon, detector and observer, has split into two 
states.  In particular, if you are the observer, there are two states of you!  On a 
fraction 2cos  of the runs, the “x, yes; y, no” version will correspond to your 
perceptions and on a fraction 2sin  of the runs the “x, no; y, yes” version will 
correspond to your perceptions.  On a given run, quantum mechanics does not say 
which version will correspond to your perceptions.  So this experiment and the 
state of Eq. (A1-3) give another example of quantum mechanics presenting us with 
more than one version of reality—one version of you perceiving polarization x and, 
at the same time, another version of you perceiving polarization y. 
 
 
 
A2. Spin and the Stern-Gerlach Experiment. 
 
 Discrete values of angular momentum, or spin as it is called on the atomic 
level, are one of the hallmarks of quantum mechanics.  The Stern-Gerlach 
experiment, used to measure spin, is one of the most-used examples for illustrating 
ideas in quantum mechanics.  So it seems useful to gather all the relevant ideas in 
one place. 
 
 The invariance chain of reasoning. As we noted in section 5, rotations of 
the whole apparatus do not affect the outcome of experiments.  This implies the 
equations must have the same form in all rotated coordinate systems.  This form 
invariance in turn implies that solutions of the equation can be labeled by spin or 
angular momentum.  And we further find that the spin, even though it is initially 
just a label on a solution, can actually be measured, so that the labels have physical 
meaning.  That is, we have this chain of reasoning—from physical invariance 
(rotations shouldn’t matter in the outcome) to mathematical invariance to a 
mathematical classification scheme for different wave functions to an actual, 
physical, measurable property of the wave function. 
 
 Classical and quantum angular momentum. Angular momentum was 
defined in classical physics centuries ago; it is the ‘momentum around the center’ 
 35 
(momentum times the radius) a ‘particle’ has when traveling in a circle.  This could 
take on any value so that classically, angular momentum is a continuous variable. 
 But that is not true in quantum mechanics.  Instead, when measured along a 
certain direction, angular momentum (spin) can only take on certain discrete 
values.  For a spin 1 wave function, the allowed values (in units of the Planck 
constant  ) are 1,0,-1.  For a spin 2 wave function, they are 2,1,0,-1,-2, and so on.  
This quantization (only a discrete number of values allowed, instead of a 
continuum) of angular momentum is one of the primary characteristics of quantum 
mechanics. 
 
 The Stern-Gerlach experiment. Angular momentum or spin is measured 
on an atomic scale by the Stern-Gerlach experiment.  A particle (particle-like wave 
function) is shot into a magnetic field and the field exerts different forces on the 
parts of the wave functions having different values of spin.  Because of the 
differing forces, the parts of the wave function with different spin exit the magnetic 
field traveling in slightly different directions.  Suppose, for example, that a spin 1 
particle is shot into the magnetic field.  Then three different streams of particles 
will come out of the apparatus; the +1 spin might be traveling slightly upward, the 
spin 0 would travel straight through, and the -1 spin would be travelling slightly 
downward.  Three different detectors could be put in the three paths to determine 
which path the particle took (this ‘particle’ and ‘which path’ language is convenient 
but misleading). 
 
 Many versions of reality. So let’s suppose the wave function for the 
particle before it reaches the magnetic field is a linear combination of the three 
possible spins, 
 
)(1|)1()(0|)0()(1|)1(| xaxaxabefore            (A2-1) 
 
where the kets, |  indicate the spin part of the wave function and the )(x  
represents the spatial part of the wave function (the same for all three here).  After 
the particle goes through the magnetic field, the wave function becomes 
 
)(1|)1()(0|)0()(1|)1(| 101 xaxaxaafter           (A2-2) 
 
where the subscripts indicate the three different spatial parts of the wave function 
take three different paths. 
 We now put a detector on each of the paths, and suppose there is an 
observer looking at the outcome (yes or no) displayed on each dial.  The full wave 
function, particle plus detectors plus observer, is then the sum of three parts; 
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





yesnonoObsyesDnoDnoDxa
noyesnoObsnoDyesDnoDxa
nonoyesObsnoDnoDyesDxa
after
,,:|:1|:0|:1|)(1|)1(
,,:|:1|:0|:1|)(0|)0(
,,:|:1|:0|:1|)(1|)1(
|
1
0
1



   (A2-3) 
 
where the a’s are the ‘sizes’ of each option.  So we see that the final state contains 
three separate versions of reality.  In particular, there are three versions of the 
observer, each perceiving a different result.  One and only one of the versions will 
correspond to what we, as ‘the’ observer, perceive, but quantum mechanics does 
not say which one.  (But it does say that if the experiment is repeated many times, 
the +1 result will be observed on a fraction 2|)1(| a  of the runs, and similarly for 0 
and -1.) 
 
 Spin ½ . There is one more intriguing point about angular momentum in 
quantum mechanics.  For the hydrogen atom, the mathematics predicts that the 
total angular momentum can be 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,… and so on, with, respectively, 1, 3, 
5, 7… components when measured along some axis.  That is, there are an odd 
number of components (different states, different number of trajectories after the 
magnetic field).  But when Stern and Gerlach measured the angular momenta of 
silver atoms, they found only two components, corresponding to an angular 
momentum of ½ (with allowed values + ½ and – ½ )!   This, in fact, was how spin 
½ was discovered. 
 Interestingly, the abstract group representational theory (with ‘abstract’ here 
meaning not associated with a particular problem) allows the observed spin ½, even 
though it does not occur in the hydrogen atom case.  This may have theoretical 
implications (section 5, the last subsection, and reference [11]).  Odd half integer 
spin particles ( 1/2, 3/2,…), known collectively as fermions, behave quite 
differently in certain situations from integer spin particles (0,1,2,…), known 
collectively as bosons. 
 
 
 
A3. Different Versions Are in Separate, 
Non-Communicating Universes. 
 
We will show that the different versions of reality in the wave function are 
in separate universes and that there can be no communication between them.  This 
result is demonstrated using a particular example, but the same arguments would 
hold whenever any ‘single-particle’ wave function (except perhaps that for a 
photon) simultaneously takes at least two different paths.   
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 Fire a spin ½ silver atom into a Stern-Gerlach device.  There will be one 
‘trajectory’ traced out by the +½  wave functions and another traced out by the –½  
wave functions.  Let )(t  be the time-dependent three dimensional volume where 
the silver atom wave function is non-zero on the +½ trajectory and  )(t  the 
corresponding volume on the –½ trajectory.  These regions are well-defined even 
after the two branches of the silver atom wave function hit the detectors, and they 
are non-overlapping after the wave function of the silver atom clears the magnet.   
 
Now consider the Schrödinger equation for the full wave function 
(including both versions of reality) describing the silver atom and the detectors; 
 
      }){,(}){,(}){,(}){,( dsdsdsds xxaxxaHt
xxaxxai  
   
(A3-1) 
where the a’s give the relative sizes of the two versions, sx  is the coordinate of the 
silver ‘atom’ and }{ dx  represents the coordinates of all the ‘atoms’ in the detectors 
(plus the observer if one wishes).   denotes the branch of the wave function 
when xs is in region  , and   the branch when xs is in region  .  Because the 
two regions do not overlap, we have (assuming no long-range interactions for the 
silver atom) 
 
   0}){,(}){,(}){,(   dsdstds xxHxxixx  when sx is in region   
(A3-2) 
 
   0}){,(}){,(}){,(   dsdstds xxHxxixx  when sx is in region   
(A3-3) 
(Note:  The H in }){,( ds xxH   does not (substantially) change the location 
of the silver atom.  Thus }){,( ds xxH   in Eq. (A3-2) is a function of xs 
which has the value 0 when xs is not in  .)   
  
Eqs. (A3-1), (A3-2) and (A3-3) imply the wave functions for the two branches 
obey their own separate equations of motion, 
 
   }){,(}){,( dsdst xxHxxi     (relevant when sx is in region  ) 
(A3-4) 
 
   }){,(}){,( dsdst xxHxxi     (relevant when sx is in region  )  
(A3-5) 
(and the Schrödinger equation is irrelevant (0=0) when sx  is in neither region.)  
Thus, because they obey their own separate equations, and because H is 
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independent of the wave function in a linear theory, the evolution of   is entirely 
independent of what happens on the   branch (and vice versa).  That is, the 
different versions act as if they were in different, non-communicating universes. 
 
 
 
A4. Classical Consistency of Observations 
in Quantum Mechanics. 
 
 We wish to show here that quantum mechanics agrees with our perception 
of a seemingly classical world.  The main ideas are that only versions of the 
observer perceive and that the versions of reality, including the versions of the 
observers, are in isolated, non-communicating universes. 
 
 To illustrate the principles, we consider an experiment on an atomic 
system with K states, k|  .  There is an apparatus, denoted by A| and an observer 
denoted by O| .  After the experiment is done, the state is 
 



K
k
kkk OAka
1
|||                                      (A4-1) 
 
Before the experiment starts, we tell the observer to write down “1, classical” if 
they see just one version of reality, and “other” if they perceive anything else (such 
as a “double exposure”).  We see from Eq. (A4-1) that each version kO| of the 
observer perceives only the kth outcome, so each version will write down “1, 
classical;”  
 



K
k
kkk classicalOAka
1
),1(||| .                                  (A4-2) 
 
“Other” is never written.  Even if we switch bases, so that each version of the 
observer is a linear combination of the kO| ,  “other” will never be written because 
kO| in the linear combinations is always ),1(| classicalOk .  And since “other” is 
never written, it must never be perceived.  Thus 
 
2-6. Perception of more than one outcome of an experiment by an observer 
can never occur within quantum mechanics. 
 
 Next we consider principle 2-9, on the agreement of observers. We ask two 
observers to write down their perceptions and then ask the second observer to look 
at the first observer’s result and write “agree” or “disagree.”  The resulting state is 
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Thus “disagree” is never written, so 
 
2-9. Quantum mechanics implies that two observers can never disagree on 
what they perceive. 
 
 We now consider principle 2-7.  We start from state (A4-1) and have the 
observer look twice at the dial.  Then we have state 
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Thus we see we never have ),(| jkO  so that an observer never has conflicting 
memories: 
 
2-7. If two observations of a single result are made successively, quantum 
mechanics implies the same consistency of results as one obtains in a 
classical universe. 
 
The same argument would apply if one did multiple experiments; results are always 
consistent within a version, and versions of the observer cannot ‘see’ from one 
isolated universe to another.   That is, because the interactions are local and 
separable, a cause in the past can never produce a classically inconsistent effect in 
the future within a version.  So each version of the observer perceives a classical 
cause and effect universe. 
 
 Finally, we separately consider principle 2-8, on the consistency of 
successive measurements.  As an example, we might have a spin ½ Stern-Gerlach 
experiment that yields two different possible trajectories for the particles exiting the 
apparatus.  We then put a second Stern-Gerlach experiment in each exit beam to re-
measure the z-component of spin.  We will find that we get consistent results, both 
experimentally and quantum mechanically. 
 To actually write out the states to show this is a notational nightmare, so we 
will talk it through.  We suppose there is a device, M , that splits the beam of 
incoming particles into N different trajectories, and on each trajectory, there is a 
readout, R, that says no (no detection) or yes (detection).  Then on each of the N 
possible trajectories, we put a similar device, M  plus a similar readout.  We 
designate the state of the apparatus before the experiment by a 0 subscript.  Then 
for any of the 1N  sets of apparatus, we have 
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  kkk RkMaRMka |||| 0                                    (A4-5) 
 
and hence for the special case jkaa kj  ,0,1  
 
 jRjMRMj |||| 0                                            (A4-6) 
 
where there is no sum in Eq. (A4-6). 
 Now we do the compound experiment.  After the first apparatus, there will 
be N versions of reality.  In version k, there will be the particle state, k| , plus a 
readout that says k yes, all others no.  Now when the particle state k|  hits the 
second apparatus, because of Eq. (A4-6), that apparatus will also register k yes, all 
others no.  Thus the second measurement must agree with the first, even if there is 
no collapse or no actual particle in a certain state.  And so we have 
 
2-8. If one measures the same property twice in a row, quantum mechanics 
implies one will get the same result. 
 
 In summary, the perceptions of ‘the observer’ in quantum mechanics will 
never disagree with what is expected classically.  (So the only problem with 
quantum mechanics is that we don’t know which version of reality will pop up.)   
 
 
  
A5. Problems with Probability in 
the Many-Worlds Interpretation. 
 
 The probability law is about the probability of perceiving a given version of 
reality.  In section 4, we argued that there could be no probability of perception in 
QMA (no particles, no collapse, no sentient beings) because (1) only versions of 
the observer perceive and (2) each version of the observer perceives its associated 
version of reality with 100% probability.  Thus there is nothing probabilistic in 
QMA, which implies there can be no probability law.   
 In this appendix, because this result is important, we will present the 
argument against probability in QMA using two somewhat different lines of 
reasoning.  In the first, we argue that one cannot properly state the probability law 
in QMA, so it certainly cannot hold there.  And in the second, we show that the 
probability law implies that a version must be singled out for perception.  As in the 
text, we argue from the state  
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so there is an equally valid version of the observer perceiving each outcome, with 
no version is singled out as the observer. 
 
 The impossibility of stating the probability law in QMA.  It would seem 
to be straightforward to state the probability law.  One possibility is: 
P1. If many runs of the experiment are made, the probability that the 
observer will perceive outcome i is 2|)(| ia . 
This statement is certainly correct experimentally, but it is not acceptable within the 
framework of QMA.  “…the observer will perceive” implies perception by a 
unique version of the observer—but there is, in QMA, no unique, singled-out 
version.  Instead there are n equally valid versions, each perceiving a different 
result.  So P1 will not do. 
 A second potential statement is:  
P2. The probability of perceiving outcome i is 2|)(| ia . 
But this dodges the issue of what it is that perceives, and that is not acceptable in 
this context.   
 A third possibility, which acknowledges that it is the versions which 
perceive, is: 
P3. On a given run, the probability of my perceptions corresponding to 
those of version )(| iobs  is 2|)(| ia . 
But because there is a version of me associated with every outcome, “my 
perceptions” are not uniquely defined.  When every outcome is perceived by a valid 
version of me, there can be no probability associated with my perceptions.  Thus P3 
will also not do in QMA (although it is quite acceptable ‘in reality’).   
 We might try:  
P4. The probability of )(| iobs  perceiving outcome i on a given run is 
2|)(| ia . 
But this won’t do because  )(| iobs  perceives outcome i on every run.   
 Finally, we might try: 
P5. The probability of outcome i occurring is 2|)(| ia . 
But that is not acceptable either, because all outcomes occur on every run so the 
only probability relevant to QMA is probability of perception. 
 The point is this: The probability law is about what is perceived, and the 
only entities that perceive in QMA are the n versions of the observer.  So  
 
The probability law in QMA must be written solely in terms of the 
perceptions of the versions of the observer,  
 
with no reference to “my” perceptions or the perceptions of “the” observer (because 
there is no “me” or singular, unique observer different from the versions).  But that 
seems patently impossible because every version of the observer perceives its 
respective outcome on every run with 100% certainty; there is nothing probabilistic 
about the perceptions of the versions.  
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 To restate the argument: When only the versions perceive, when every 
version is of equal perceptual status so that no version is singled out as ‘me,’ and 
when each version perceives its respective outcome on every run—that is, when 
there is no probabilistic or coefficient-dependent aspect to the n perception 
processes—there is no way within QMA to obtain a coefficient-dependent 
probability of perception. 
 We note that the statements P1 and P3, acceptable in reality (but not in 
QMA), are most easily understood if one version of the observer is somehow 
singled out (in a valid interpretation) as being the observer. 
 
 Adding the probability law as an assumption.  Suppose we try an 
interpretation, QMB, which consists of QMA plus the assumption that the 
probability law holds.  This doesn’t work either because, under the restrictions of 
QMA (no particles, no collapse, no sentient beings), as we have observed, one 
cannot state the probability law.  Thus the probability law cannot simply be added 
on because, when only the versions perceive, the law cannot be properly stated.    
 Or, we could say that it’s permissible to add the assumption, but this new 
QMB interpretation comes with baggage; it must contain some mechanism for 
singling out one version as the one corresponding to “me.”  If one version is not 
singled out, the probability law cannot hold because there is no probability of 
perception of the versions in QMA.  (Also, see below, on the necessity for singling 
out.) 
 
 Other approaches to probability in the many-worlds 
interpretation. There have been a number of attempts [36-41] to introduce 
probability into QMA through a ‘subjective’ process: After the experiment 
is done and the result recorded by the versions of the apparatus, but before 
the observer perceives the recorded results, each version of the observer is 
uncertain about what he will perceive.  This uncertainty is said to lead to a 
coefficient-dependent probability for expectations of perceptions.  But no 
logical explanation has been given—from within the confines of the QMA 
scheme rather than from the perspective of ‘actuality’—for why uncertainty 
implies a coefficient-dependent probability.  In fact, one can give an 
analogy which shows that the size of the coefficients is irrelevant in this 
situation.  Suppose n observers are led, blindfolded, into n different-sized 
rooms (analogous to the n different branches with different norms).  If one 
of the observers is asked the probability of being in room 3, surely the size 
of the rooms has nothing to do with the answer.   
 In addition, the subjective method seems irrelevant to the problem of 
stating the probability law in QMA because the experimentally observed 
law must be stated in terms that pertain to actual perceptions rather than the 
expectations of the perceptions by the versions. 
 There have been attempts to derive the probability law [38, 42-44] 
from within QMA but none of them has stated the law in an acceptable 
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form.  Unless one can suitably state the probability law, which I claim is 
impossible, the conclusion is that the explicit or implicit assumptions made 
in these attempted derivations—for example, that probability is a property 
of the wave functions—carry one beyond the confines of the un-amended 
QMA. 
 
The necessity for singling out.  By looking at a particular case, we can see 
the problem with probability in QMA from a different perspective.  Suppose we 
consider a two-state system,  
 
 2|1| 21 aa ,                                                   (A5-2) 
 
with 0001.||,9999.|| 22
2
1  aa , and suppose we do ten runs, with the observer 
perceiving the results of every run.  There will be 024,1210   possible outcomes 
and 1,024 versions of the observer, each equally valid.  But we know experientially 
that my perceptions will (almost always) correspond to only one of them, the one 
with all ten outcomes 1.  That is, one version from among all the 1,024 versions is 
(almost always) singled-out as the one corresponding to my experiential 
perceptions. 
But in the QMA interpretation, every one of the 1024 versions of the 
observer perceives its respective outcome on every run of 10.  So why am “I” never 
the version of the observer that perceives, say, five outcomes 2?  There is no reason 
within QMA, where all versions of me are of equal perceptual status (and there is 
no unique, ‘external’ me separate from the versions).  That is, our awareness of 
only the ten outcomes 1 state is not consistent with the bare QMA. 
More generally, if I consistently perceive one version more than another, 
then there must be a unique version singled out as me on each run.  (One could 
counter that all versions are equivalent, but the bias comes in the assignment of 
“my” perceptions to one version or the other.  But in this case, one has still 
assumed a singular, unique “me,” different from the versions.) 
The seemingly inescapable conclusion is that there must be a coefficient-
dependent mechanism (collapse? hidden variables? a “Mind?”), outside QMA, 
which singles out one version of the observer as the one corresponding to “my” 
perceptions.   
 
 
 
A6. All Versions of the Observer 
Are Equally Aware. 
 
 When we perceive the results of an experiment with many potential 
outcomes, we are consciously aware (however you wish to define that) of one and 
only one outcome.  So we might expect that one and only one version of the 
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observer is aware in quantum mechanics.  But we will show here that that is not the 
situation in the QMA (no particles, no collapse, no sentient beings) interpretive 
scheme; all versions are equally aware. 
From the point of view of neuroscience or philosophy, what is meant by 
awareness or consciousness is not so easy to pin down.  But we can define it in a 
general way that is suitable for our purposes here.  The wave functions are all that 
exist in QMA, and so awareness can only correspond to some property—
synchronous oscillations of many regions of the brain, for example—of the wave 
function of the observer’s brain or brain-body. 
To see what happens to the observer’s awareness when a measurement 
results in several simultaneously existing versions of the observer, we consider an 
experiment on an atomic system with K states, k|  .  There is an apparatus, denoted 
by A| and an observer denoted by O| .  The initial state, before the measurement, 
with an aware observer, is 
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We do the measurement in two steps.  First we let the apparatus measure and 
record the results but we cover the readout of the apparatus with an X, so the state 
is  
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where the subscript on the observer state indicates that that version is in universe k.  
Now we have ‘the observer’ look at the reading on the apparatus.  We suppose that 
some versions of the observer are aware and others are not.  Then the final state is 
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But the K states are in separate, non-communicating universes (see appendix A3), 
and there can therefore be no coordination between the evolutions of the versions 
of the observer from the aware state of (A6-2) to either an aware or a not-aware 
state in (A6-3).  The evolution of each version to an aware or not-aware state is 
individually, separately determined by ‘chance,’ perhaps depending on the way the 
photons hit the eye in the different versions. This means that, if the not-aware sum 
is non-zero—if an aware state of the observer is sometimes carried by chance to an 
unaware state—then by chance (because there is no coordination between versions) 
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there would sometimes be a situation in which no version of the observer was 
aware at the end.   
 But from our experience of awareness, that is not an allowable outcome; we 
are always aware of a result.  So the only way the time evolution can be made 
consistent with the at-least-one-aware requirement is to suppose the observer state 
X) of (aware| kO  evolves to an aware version, k) of (aware| kO , on every branch.  
All versions are equally aware in QMA, just as aware as the original version of the 
observer! Thus if “I” perceive one result, there are n – 1 other, equally aware “I”s 
perceiving the other results. 
 
Comment 1: Instead of ‘awareness,’ we could use any property that might 
be used to single out just one version and the argument still goes through.  In 
particular, even though we are experientially aware of just one outcome, this result 
implies that no one version can be singled out as me in QMA; there are K equally 
valid versions of me. 
 
Comment 2: There is one way the above argument could fail and that is if 
the awareness-distinguishing feature is carried by the apparatus or the atomic 
system.  Then the distinguishing feature could be transferred to the observer wave 
function in the transition from (A6-2) to (A6-3).  But a singling-out of this sort 
amounts to a hidden variable theory (one version ‘physically’ distinguished from 
the others), and that is forbidden by hypothesis here. 
 
 
 
A7. Small Parts of the Wave Function Carry  
the Full Energy, Momentum and so on. 
 
 One of the primary reasons Einstein proposed his particulate photon model 
of light (in 1905, before quantum mechanics) was that a classical light wave could 
not transfer a sufficient amount of energy to electrons to knock them out of a metal.  
The reasoning was that a small portion of the (classical) light wave carried a 
correspondingly small part of the energy, and since an electron was small, it could 
not quickly accumulate enough energy from the light wave.  But with a proper 
understanding of the properties of the wave function, we can see that Einstein’s 
reasoning is not applicable. 
 
  The basic idea is that when a wave function splits into several parts, each 
part carries the full mass, energy, momentum, spin, and charge.  This holds because 
the operators associated with these quantities are linear and local.  We will 
illustrate for energy and momentum, but the argument would be similar for the 
other quantities.  
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 We shoot a spin ½ particle into a Stern-Gerlach apparatus.  Before the 
particle reaches the magnet, the wave function is 
 
   1|)(|,)(),( 23)(3 00 kfkdekfkdtx ktkixikk                (A7-1) 
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so that the initial wave function is essentially an eigenfunction of energy and 
momentum. 
 Now the wave function goes through the magnet and splits into two parts,  
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where the primed and double-primed k’s indicate where the corresponding f’s have 
a sharp peak, with 000 ''' kkk  .  But we see that  
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So each of the two separate parts has (nearly) the same energy and momentum as 
the original wave.  The energy and momentum did not split up according to the 
values of 22/1 || a  and 
2
2/1 || a .  This means the small part of the light wave 
function that hits one electron in the photoelectric (or Compton) effect carries the 
full energy and momentum (and spin) of the wave function. 
 
 Conservation Laws.  One might imagine that if each small part carries the 
full energy and momentum, we have given too much energy and momentum to the 
full wave function.  But energy and momentum (and charge, etc.) do not add across 
sums; they only add across products of wave functions (because the corresponding 
operators are essentially first-order derivatives). 
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 Classical Electromagnetic Waves.  Why does a classical electromagnetic 
wave behave differently in this respect from the wave function?  Because it is made 
up of many localized light-like wave functions, and each small portion of the 
classical wave contains only the energy and momentum of those photon-like wave 
functions localized in that region of space. 
 
 
 
A8. Bell’s Theorem and Non-Locality. 
 
 In 1964, Bell [12] proved that if all the information regarding a particle-like 
state was contained locally, say within a centimeter of the localized wave function, 
then there would be a conflict with quantum mechanics.  In particular, he showed 
that if two particles, electrons or photons, were initially in a spin 0 state which split 
into two single-particle states that moved away from each other, there would be 
correlations between the two measured spin states that would be different from 
what quantum mechanics predicted.  This experiment has been done by Aspect [13] 
and others, and it was found that the quantum mechanical laws were obeyed.  Thus 
we have a proof that there can be no local hidden variable theories. 
 
 Our view of these results is: In interpreting the results of this experiment, is 
often assumed there are (localized) particles.  Under that assumption, one needs 
instantaneous long-range signaling between the particles to account for the 
correlations in the Aspect experiment.  (And this is often stretched to imply that 
everything is interconnected.)  But if there are no particles (section 7), there is no 
need for signaling; it is just quantum mechanics as usual, with its inherent non-
locality. 
 
 Non-locality via the wave function.  With all due respect to Bell—he 
started a major line of inquiry in quantum mechanics—it seems to me that one 
could reasonably expect hidden variable theories to be non-local, in contrast to 
Bell’s assumption.  First, one knows that the wave functions of quantum mechanics 
contain non-local information; the Aspect experiment and theory tell us that.  
Second, we see from the Bohm hidden variable model (page 22) that the hidden 
variables can depend locally on the wave function (velocities are derivatives of the 
local phase angle of the wave function).  So one could imagine a hidden variable 
theory in which there is indirect non-locality: Each of the hidden variable sets for 
the two particle-like states takes its information locally from the wave function.  
But because the wave function contains non-local information, the conditions for 
Bell’s theorem no longer apply.  Thus there are reasonable objections to Bell’s 
locality assumption for hidden variable theories. 
 
 Correlations vs. ‘influence.’  On the surface, it looks like the measurement 
on one ‘particle’ influences the state of the distant ‘particle.’  But if there are no 
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particles, and if there is no collapse, then detection of the state of one particle-like 
wave function does not in any way affect or influence the quantum state of the 
second, distant particle-like wave function.  All we can say is there is a correlation 
between the measurements on the two distant particle-like wave functions. 
 
 
 
A9. The Wheeler Delayed-Choice Experiment. 
 
 A Mach-Zehnder interferometer is set up so that a light wave is divided by a 
half-silvered mirror and travels on two different paths.  After the photon-like wave 
function has been divided but before it is detected, the detector at the end of the 
interferometer is rapidly adjusted to one of two possible settings.  If particulate 
photons exist, then the measured results from the two different settings depend on 
which path the conjectured particulate photon took.  Under this assumption, the 
experimental results show that the conjectured photon made a choice of path after it 
had passed the point where the paths divide—a violation of our intuitive 
understanding of causality.   
 If, however, one assumes only the wave function exists (no particulate 
photons), then quantum mechanics, as it is, gives the correct answer, with no after-
the-fact choice involved.  That is, the assumption of the existence of particles gets 
us in causality trouble, but no-particle quantum mechanics does not.  So I would 
take the results of the Wheeler delayed-choice experiment [14,15] as more evidence 
(in addition to that of sections 5, 6, and 7) for no particles rather than as causality 
operating backwards in time (from the later time when the detector setting was 
changed, with the photon was halfway to the second mirror, to the earlier time 
when the photon had not yet passed the first mirror). 
 
 
 
A10.  The Quantum Eraser Experiment. 
 
 The aim of this set of experiments [16,17] is similar to that of the Wheeler 
delayed-choice experiment in that if one assumes the existence of particles, then 
one gets into causality—and locality—troubles.  Before explaining the 
experiments, we should say that no-particle quantum mechanics gives results in 
agreement with the experiments.  So our view is that one is using an unsupported 
idea—particles—to derive seemingly surprising results. 
 
 Experiment 1. The experiment uses two entangled photons, originally in a 
spin 0 state, that fly apart from each other.  If one has polarization in the x-
direction, then the other has polarization in the y-direction, no matter what 
orientation is chosen for the x and y axes.  In this first experiment, photon 1 goes 
through a double slit and is then detected on a screen while photon 2 is simply 
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detected.  The results are not surprising; when the experiment is run many times, 
one gets the usual double-slit interference pattern on the photon 1 screen. 
 
 Experiment 2. The light from the two slits in photon 1’s path are put 
through special crystals that tinker with the polarization (see appendix A1) so that 
the polarization of the light that goes through one slit is completely different from 
the polarization of the light that goes through the other slit.  In that case, the light 
from the two different slits cannot interfere, so one gets a single-slit interference 
pattern on the screen. 
 
 Experiment 3.  The light from photon 2 is now polarized and detected.  
The polarization of the second photon has the effect that the crystals in front of the 
two slits no longer give different polarizations to the light from the two different 
slits.  Thus the two beams interfere and one again gets a double-slit interference 
pattern spread out over the screen. 
 From one point of view, this seems remarkable.  The experimental 
arrangement for photon 1 was not changed from experiment 2 and yet the results 
for photon 1 are different from those of experiment 2.  This would appear to be 
saying that if there are particles which are in a definite state—position and 
polarization—at each instant, then the polarization state of particle 2 affects the 
trajectory (from slits to screen) of the distant particle 1. 
 
 Experiment 4.  Same experimental setup as in experiment 3 except that the 
polarizer and the detector for photon 2 are moved far away, so photon 1 is detected 
before photon 2.  One still gets a double-slit interference pattern.  (But if photon 2 
were not detected, or if it were detected as in experiment 2, one would get a single-
slit pattern.) 
 Again from a certain point of view, this is saying that the state of particle 2, 
determined only after particle 1 is detected, retroactively affects the trajectory of 
distant particle 1.  That is, causality appears to work backwards in time. 
  
 Explanation.  In all the experiments, there is a coincidence circuit that 
accepts only those results where both detector 1 and detector 2 detect (within a 
certain time frame).  So in experiments 3 and 4, one is measuring the pattern made 
by many 1 photons given that photon 2 has a certain polarization.  If the polarizer 
for photon 2 were rotated 90 degrees, one would still get a double-slit interference 
pattern, but if the two double-slit interference patterns for 1 ( from 0 degrees and 90 
degrees) were superimposed, they would just give the single-slit pattern of 
experiment 2!  Thus the polarizer in path 2, plus the coincidence counter, 
effectively selects for a certain set of 1 photons and these give the double-slit 
pattern even though the set of all 1 photons gives the single-slit pattern.   
 If one postulates particles, and if one requires that each particle be in a 
definite state at each instant, then experiment 3 seems to require action-at-a-
distance between the two particles.  And experiment 4 seems to require retroactive 
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action-at-a-distance.  But if one postulates no-particle quantum mechanics, the 
experiments simply verify the correlations predicted by quantum mechanics 
between the two entangled photon-like wave functions. 
 This is a summary of the write-up at .grad.physics.sunysb.edu/~amarch 
which is best reached by Googling “quantum eraser.” 
 
 
 
A11. Problem with the Kochen-Specker Proof of  
No Hidden Variables. 
 
 It has been conjectured that even though one cannot show there are 
particles, there may still be ‘hidden’ (not detectable by experiment) variables that 
determine the unique outcome of an experiment, or at least the outcome we 
perceive.  At a given time, there is a unique, single-valued set of these hidden 
variables (as opposed to the many versions of reality of the wave function), so they 
are objective.   
 
 The Kochen-Specker reasoning.  Kochen and Specker [22], and later 
Conway and Kochen [23], used an ingenious argument in an attempt to show that it 
is not possible to have an underlying hidden variable theory.  The primary 
characteristic of a hidden variable theory is that,  
 
A11-A. Once the hidden variables (whatever they are) are set, the outcome 
of every possible experiment is determined.   
 
Kochen and Specker then showed that for certain sets of experiments, this led to a 
contradiction.   That is, they claim it is logically impossible to satisfy principle 
A11-A in every situation!  If this is correct and free of hidden assumptions, then it 
would constitute a proof that there could be no hidden variable theory. 
 To explain their reasoning in more detail, we will review the Conway-
Kochen paper arXiv 0604097, The Free Will Theorem [23].  The system 
investigated has spin 1.  In such a system, the three components of spin squared, 
222 ,, zyx  , commute, so they can be simultaneously measured.  The possible 
outcomes are 0 and 1, and it can be shown that only one of the three can give 0, so 
that the other two must yield 1.  It is assumed that the hidden variables   are set, 
so that the results of a set of 3 measurements along any set of axes are determined.  
They then find a series of sets of 3 measurements such that one eventually ends up 
with two measurements along orthogonal axes both giving 0, which is a 
mathematical impossibility. 
 
 On the other hand, we have the Bohm model, which is a valid hidden 
variable theory within its limitations.  That is, it is constructed in such a way that, 
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for any experiment, the 2|)(| ia probability law is always satisfied.  We can 
construct a spin 1 system in the Bohm model by having two spin 0 particles in a 
bound state.  And there is no overt requirement in the K-S-C method, as far as I 
know, that disqualifies the Bohm model.   (The Bohm model is not relativistic, but 
relativity does not enter the K-S-C impossibility argument.)   From this we are led 
to conjecture that there must be some hidden assumption in the K-S-C reasoning 
which makes it invalid.   
 The most likely problem is that one can show that A11-A is wrong.  To see 
why, consider the bound-state spin 1 system in the Bohm model.  In the model, one 
derives trajectories for each of the particles from the Schrödinger equation, and it is 
imagined that particles are put on one of those two-particle trajectories.  We will 
call the hidden variables, the positions and velocities of the two particles, specified 
at time 0, 0 .  Then the two particles follow very complicated trajectories.  
Suppose at some point in time, we measure the z spin component squared.  Because 
of the complicated trajectories, fixing 0 does not fix the measured value; that value 
also depends on when (using time-of-flight after fixing 0 ) the measurement is 
made.  And the oscillation in time between different outcomes is extremely rapid.  
Thus principle A11-A should read 
 
A11-B. Once the hidden variables and the detector geometry are set, the 
outcome of every possible experiment is determined.   
 
But because K-S-C have not specified the experimental setup for measuring the 
components of spin, they have not taken the detector geometry into account in their 
argument.  Because the geometry changes as one measures along different sets of 
axes, it is quite possible that their assumptions about how measurements carry over 
from one set of 3 measurements to another is incorrect. 
 So before one can accept the K-S-C “no-go” theorem, it needs to be shown 
that one can ignore the role of the detector geometry.  Further, one needs to know 
how to deal with the apparent counter-example, the Bohm model, to their no-go 
theorem.  
 
 
 
A12. Mathematical Collapse Implies Non-Linearity. 
 
 The primary characteristic of quantum mechanics is that it is linear.  
Therefore it is logical to ask whether mathematical collapse can fit within a linear 
theory in which the probability law holds.  We find that it cannot; the probability 
law requires a mathematical collapse to be non-linear. 
 Non-unitary time translation.  If the Hamiltonian H is Hermitian (so time 
translation is unitary), as it is in conventional theory, then the norms of the different 
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branches of the wave function stay the same forever.  So there can be no collapse if 
one sticks to a linear, unitary theory.  But what would happen if we kept the 
Hamiltonian linear but allowed it to be non-Hermitian so that time translation is no 
longer unitary?  Suppose in particular that some part of the Hamiltonian can change 
the norm of the wave function, with the change depending on the random variables 
w, where the choice of w’s at each stage in the time evolution is independent of the 
coefficients (linearity).  Then we have for the general linear case, with O being the 
time translation operator, 
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where the conjectured Hamiltonian is presumed to have no effect on the ‘shape’ of 
the wave function (and we have ignored the non-collapse part of the Hamiltonian).  
In this case, it might happen that after some time has elapsed, for some value of i,  
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so we end up with a system which has collapsed to state i.  Thus linearity does not 
rule out collapse. 
 
The 2|)(| ia probability law requires collapse to be nonlinear.  But now 
suppose the collapse follows the |ai|2 probability law.  Then for large t and given i, 
Eq. (A12-2) will hold (depending on the sequence of w’s chosen) a fraction |ai|2 of 
the time and the same equation with 1 replaced by 0 will hold the rest of the time.  
Thus to satisfy the |ai|2 probability law, the average (averaged over the choice of 
w’s) of the ratio must obey 
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where P is the probability of a certain set of w’s, and the integral over all possible 
w’s is suitably defined.  If P(w) is independent of the coefficients, this cannot hold 
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because the left hand side has no dependence on the ia .  Thus to satisfy Eq. (A12-
3), P(w) must depend on the coefficients. 
Suppose now we think of numerically integrating the equation of motion, 
including the w-dependent random part, step by small step.  At each step in the 
integration, the choice of w’s dictated by ),...,;()( 1 KwPwP   depends on the 
coefficients.  And then the dependence of the Hamiltonian on the w’s gives an 
indirect dependence of the Hamiltonian on the coefficients, so that different initial 
ai’s will produce different w’s.  But then  
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and so the equations of motion are non-linear, in contrast to current quantum 
mechanics. 
 
 
 
A13. Collapse by Conscious Perception. 
 
 To illustrate the difficulties facing the proposal of collapse by conscious 
perception, we will look at a Stern-Gerlach experiment on a spin ½ silver atom.  
There is a detector on the trajectory of the – ½ branch but none on the trajectory of 
the + ½ branch, with the detector reading “yes” for detection and “no” for no 
detection.  Suppose the observer is initially gazing off into space and then, a couple 
of seconds after the silver atom passes the detector, she focuses her attention on the 
detector.   
 Presumably, for an instant, there are two versions of the observer, 
perceiving both the yes and the no branches.  In this instant, there must be 
something—we will call it a “Mind”—outside quantum mechanics, which realizes 
‘the observer’ is perceiving a multi-version reality.  That is, the “Mind” must 
somehow become aware that there are two separate versions of the observer’s brain 
wave function.  And then, in the next instant, the “Mind” collapses the wave 
function to just one option. 
 
 There are three problems with this approach.  They do not rule it out, but 
they still need to be addressed.  The first is that conscious perception—focusing the 
eyes on the dial in this case—is a complicated neural process.  So it is not clear at 
what point in that process the “Mind,” perceiving the state of the brain, knows there 
are two versions. 
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 For the second problem, suppose the observer focuses on the dial the whole 
time, from before the atom is shot through the apparatus to after it passes the 
detector.  And suppose the final result is that the detector is perceived as continuing 
to read no, so there is, in the conventional sense, no change in the dial reading from 
beginning to end.  In that case, the observer has not consciously (in the 
conventional sense) perceived anything that could have cued the collapse.  This 
implies the definition of “conscious perception” must be amended from its 
conventional meaning to accommodate collapse by “conscious perception.”  It also 
implies, as indicated above, that the Mind, associated with the individual brain, is 
perceiving more than one version. 
 To illustrate the third problem, we again use a Stern-Gelach experiment, 
with detectors on both branches.  The state is 
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Now each version of the observer’s brain is independent of the coefficients; for 
example, the neural firing pattern for each version does not depend on )2/1(a  or 
)2/1(a .  However, the “Mind” must collapse the wave function in accord with 
the 2|)(| ia  probability law, so the “Mind” must have access to the values of those 
coefficients.  But it is not possible to get those values strictly from the wave 
function of the observer’s brain.  So some process must be proposed for how the 
“Mind” ‘senses’ the value of the coefficients.  This observation virtually guarantees 
that the collapsing “Mind” must perceive more than just the wave function of the 
individual brain.  To obtain information on the coefficients, it must apparently 
perceive the whole wave function. 
 
 
 
A14. Spread of the Wave Packet. 
Application to Brain Processes. 
 
 The question is whether quantum mechanics is relevant in the brain.  The 
primary dynamics of the brain is that there is an electrochemical pulse which 
travels from one end of a neuron to another.  The propagation of this pulse is 
classical; quantum mechanics is irrelevant here (as far as we currently know).  But 
the initiation of pulses makes use of the synapses, the small separations between 
adjacent neurons, and these synapses are small enough—less than a thousand atoms 
or 100 nm across—that quantum processes are potentially relevant.  In fact, using 
an argument due to Stapp [4], we can show that quantum considerations are almost 
certainly relevant for neural processes. 
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 Synapses and calcium ions. The synapses determine whether or not a pulse 
in one neuron triggers a pulse in the next neuron, and so they control the flow of 
thoughts.  The passing-on or not-passing-on is in turn partly controlled by calcium 
ions.  Classically and simplistically speaking, if a calcium ion is near that edge of a 
synapse which is next to the synapse of another neuron, •) (, the pulse will be 
passed on.  That is, the positions of the calcium ions, in effect, control the flow of 
thoughts. 
 Now the wave function of a calcium ion (or any particle) doesn’t just sit, 
unmoving, in space; it spreads out.  So one way that quantum mechanics can be 
relevant to the brain is if a single calcium ion spreads out over the whole synapse in 
a reasonable time.  If it does, within a time appropriate for neural processes, then 
the quantum state of the synapse will be a linear combination of [passing on] and 
[not passing on] the electrochemical pulse.  In that case, quantum mechanical 
considerations are indeed relevant to the functioning of the brain. 
 
 The spread of calcium ions. So the question becomes: Do calcium ions 
spread out over the synapse in the time, approximately 1 millisecond, relevant to 
neural processes?  To see, we use the uncertainty principle 
 
 px                                                     (A14-1) 
 
Suppose we have a calcium atom initially centered at the origin and use 
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From these two equations, we get 
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where 0x is the initial spread in the wave function. 
 
 A reasonable initial spread for the wave packet is 10 nm, and a conservative 
representative time for brain processes is a tenth of a millisecond.  We also have 
3410  and 271066  xmCa  in mks units.  If we put these numbers in, we get 
500spreadx nm, which is more than adequate for the calcium ion to spread around 
the synapse.   
 The conclusion is: Because the wave function for a single calcium ion 
quickly spreads around the synapse, the quantum state of the synapse is a linear 
combination of passing on and not passing on the pulse.  Thus quantum mechanical 
considerations certainly cannot be ruled out for brain processes. 
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 One further point.  There is a book [45] by the Nobel laureate brain 
researcher John Eccles called “How the SELF Controls Its BRAIN.”  Because of the 
spread of the calcium wave packets, the wave function of the brain is a linear 
combination of trillions of different possible thoughts and signals for bodily 
actions.  The Mind, if one subscribes to that interpretation, can ‘control’ the 
thoughts and actions by choosing one of those neural states to concentrate on.  But 
the organizational problem, how to pick out just the right combination of firing 
neurons to cause a particular thought or bodily movement, is formidable.  It must 
presumably be solved by some combination of the structure of the physical brain 
along with a set of organizational templates that are indigenous to the ‘non-
physical’ Mind. 
 
 
 
A15. Comments on Probability in the 
Mind-MIND Interpretation. 
 
 Non-Standard Probability.  How could the perceived results of many runs 
of the Stern-Gerlach experiment always be near m/N=|a1|2 if just the end result is 
perceived, but not near that value if every intermediate result is perceived?  It does 
not arise because the non-physical Mind is influencing the outcome of each event 
(there is, in fact, no ‘outcome of each event’ because all the versions of reality 
continue forever).  To see what is happening, suppose the ‘probability law’ for the 
Mind perceiving event i is )5)(.1)((1.)( xxxxxs   where x is the amplitude 
squared.  Then if each individual result is observed, the value for m/N will be near 
2
1 ||),( axxs  , in disagreement with the |ai|
2 probability law.  But if only the end 
result is observed, the value for m/N will be the one that maximizes )(xs  where  
x is the appropriate amplitude squared,  
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From Stirling’s approximation for the factorial and the chain rule for derivatives, 
we find this gives a maximum at m/N = |a1|2, in agreement with the |ai|2 probability 
law. 
 
 The Rutherford Experiment.  One might suspect that experiments in 
which every outcome is observed have already been done.  In particular, suppose 
we consider the original (1911) Rutherford scattering experiment, where a flash of 
light was observed (by a graduate student using a microscope) every time a decay 
particle hit the zinc sulfide detector.  This experiment won’t do as a test of the 
probability law, however, because not every outcome is observed.  Only that very 
small fraction of events where the decay particle hits the small detector is observed.  
 57 
And one can show in that case that the |ai|2 law will indeed hold (except perhaps for 
an overall normalization factor) no matter what the ‘probability law’ is for the 
perception of individual events.  
To sketch the argument, suppose we do a scattering experiment in which 
there are R scattering events per second, but we observe only those events which 
register in a very small solid angle.  Then one can prove that the scattering 
amplitudes squared are, to a good approximation, functions of the product Rt|ai|2 
rather than being functions of |ai|2 and Rt separately, where t is the time the 
experiment has been run, and ai is the amplitude for scattering into solid angle i.  
This implies that, independent of the functional dependence of probability on |ai|2 , 
the average time for observing a single event i is proportional to 1/(R|ai|2), which is 
exactly the result one obtains if the probability law is |ai|2.  Thus the individually 
observed scattering events in the original Rutherford experiment give no 
information on the specific probability law. 
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